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I. INTRODUCTION
The Darien - Choc6 Region is a privileged but abandoned
region - privileged because it enjoys rich biological and cultural
diversities. As one of the most species-rich regions on earth, the
region truly deserves its natural world heritage classification.' It
1. See United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], Protected Areas
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is a biological, political, and economic crossroads that connects
North and South America and the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
The region suffers, however, from a number of unfortunate
realities. It is isolated from centers of power in Colombia and
Panama, and government services and transportation infrastruc-
ture are clearly deficient. Active colonization and deforestation
fronts eat at the tropical forest ecosystem on both sides of the bor-
der along existing roads.2 The region's communities display high
levels of poverty and unsatisfied basic human needs. The area is
rife with conflicts over land, power, and geopolitics. The Colom-
bian portion of the region has been the scene of extreme political
violence for more than twenty years that has caused a grave
humanitarian crisis for indigenous and Afro-Colombian
populations.'
Today, once again, strong initiatives are afoot to construct a
highway through the region. Termination of this segment of the
Pan-American Highway remains a major symbol for hemispheric
integration and emerging forces of globalization in Colombia and
Panama. While the Pan-American Highway today ends at Yaviza
(Panama) and Lomas Aisladas (Colombia), the debate continues to
focus on the Dari6n Gap (referred to in Spanish as the Tap6n de
Darign - the Dari6n Bottleneck) and the possibility of connecting
the two nations' highway systems. The 108 km stretch of tropical
rainforest in Darien Province (58 km in Panama) and Choc6
Department (50 km in Colombia) remains the only unfinished link
in the 25,800 km Pan-American Highway System from Alaska to
Patagonia. Ironically, although Panama was a "department" of
Colombia for almost a century until its independence in 1903,
today these two nations are probably the only neighboring coun-
tries in the world without a road connection.
Seldom does road construction present such glaring and con-
trasting realities. Globalization and trade present arguments for
the road, as does the need to increase provision of government ser-
vices to the region. However, the area's ecology and human com-
munities stand to lose much in the process. This region will be a
showcase struggle in the coming decades between the forces of
globalization and neo-liberal economic integration on the one
Programme, World Heritage Sites: Darien National Park, http://www.unep-wcmc.org/
protectedareas/datalwh/darien.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) [hereinafter World
Heritage Sites: Darign].
2. See supra Part II.E.1.
3. See supra Part II.E.4.
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hand and environmental conservation and community-based
development on the other.
II. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE PANAMA-COLOMBIA
BORDER REGION
The Panama-Colombia border region, formed by two adminis-
trative units (Darien Province in Panamd and Choc6 Department
in Colombia), is a unique biogeographical region containing a
large area of wet tropical rainforest.4 This Dari~n-Choc6 region,
bordered by both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, has tradition-
ally been a frontier area for both nations, poorly integrated into
the national economies and largely ignored by government enti-
ties - yet of great strategic importance.5
A. Natural Features
The Continental Divide is only about twenty kilometers from
the Atlantic Ocean in eastern Panama at the boundary of Darien
Province with the Kuna Yala Indian Comarca (an autonomous
administrative area).6 To the south is Dari6n Province, Panama's
largest (16,671 km2 ). As the Colombian Pacific coastal range
enters Panama from the south, it divides into three ranges that
define the watersheds of three of Dari6n's major rivers - Tuira,
Balsas, and Samb6 - all flowing into the Pacific." The northern-
most range separating Darien from Kuna Yala is known as the
Serrania del Darign.9 The province has precipitation between two
and five meters per year, and its vegetation (until recent years)
4. See ARDEN & PRICE CONSULTING & THE UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI, ATLAS DE Los
RECURSOS MARINO-COSTEROS DE LA PROVINCIA DEL DARIgN [ATLAS OF MARINE-
COASTAL RESOURCES OF DARItN PROVINCE] A-i, C-3 (2003); GRAN ATLAS Y GEOGRAFtA
DE COLOMBIA [GREAT ATLAS AND GEOGRAPHY OF COLOMBIA] 34, 44, 138 (Intermedio
Editores, 2004) [hereinafter GRAAN ATLAS].
5. See Pascal 0. Girot, The Darign Region between Colombia and Panama: Gap
or Seal?, in HUMAN RIGHTS & THE ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND NORMS IN A
GLOBALIZING WORLD 172, 179, 183 (Lyuba Zarsky ed., 2002).
6. See INSTITUTO GEOGRAFICO NACIONAL "TOMmy GUARDIA" ["TOMMY GUARDIA"
NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC INSTITUTE], ATLAS NACIONAL DE LA REPUBLCA DE PANAMA
[NATIONAL ATLAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA] 2-3 (1988) [hereinafter NATIONAL
ATLAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA].
7. Id. at 216.
8. AUTORIDAD NACIONAL DEL AMBIENTE [NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITY],
PARQUES NACIONALES DE PANAMA [NATIONAL PARKS OF PANAMA] 102-03 (2004)
[hereinafter PANAMANIAN NATIONAL PARKS].
9. See NATIONAL ATLAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA, supra note 6, at 206.
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was largely tropical rainforest. 10 The eastern half of Dari6n that
borders Colombia and forms Dari6n National Park still is covered
with tropical forests.11 One of the major geographic features in
Darien is the Gulf of San Miguel, Panama's largest estuary (1,760
km2 ) surrounded by extensive mangrove forests. 2 Over ten major
rivers flow into this estuary, including two of Panama's largest,
the Chucunaque and Tuira.
13
Choc6 Department (46,530 km2 in area) in Colombia shares
the biogeographcial region with Darien Province, Panama. 14 The
700 km long Atrato River, draining northward into the Gulf of
Urabd (Caribbean Sea), largely defines Choc6.'5 At the complex
Atrato Delta lies a major wetland system, called the Tumarad6
Wetlands, which forms a natural obstacle to road transportation
across the Atrato. 6 Precipitation in Choc6 is even higher than in
Darien and generally ranges between three and six m/yr.17 Natu-
ral vegetation includes primarily tropical rainforest and swamp
forests (cativales).s  However, extensive deforestation has
occurred in many areas adjacent to the Atrato River, surrounding
10. See ATLAS OF MARINE-COASTAL RESOURCES OF DARIIAN PROVINCE, supra note 4,
at B-3a.
11. See id. at C-3.
12. See id. at B-1, C-4.
13. See CONSULTORtA PARA ELABORAR EL PLAN DE MANEJO COSTERO INTEGRAL EN
EL GOLFO DE SAN MIGUEL Y ZONAS ADYACENTES EN EL MARCO DEL PROGRAMA DE
DESARROLLO SOSTENIBLE DEL DARI9N [CONSULTING PROJECT TO DEVELOP THE
INTEGRATED COASTAL MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE GULF OF SAN MIGUEL AND
ADJACENT ZONES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DARIEN SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAM] 7 (Arden & Price Consulting and the University of Miami, 2003) (on file
with author) [hereinafter CONSULTORtA]; Daniel Suman, The Case of the Shrimp
Industry in Eastern Panama (Darign Province): Unsustainable Harvest of a Valuable
Export Product and its Limited Impact on Local Community Development, in
GLOBALIZATION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: ISSUES AND APPLICATIONS 192, 193-
95 (Rebecca Lee Harris ed., 2006), available at http://www.patelcenter.usf.edulassets/
pdf/SustDevSuman.pdf.
14. GRAN ATLAS, supra note 4, at 138.
15. Id. at 138-39.
16. Id. at 35, 41, 117; INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE VtAS [INVIAS] [NATIONAL HIGHWAY
INSTITUTE], ESTUDIO DE DIAGNOSTICO AMBIENTAL DE ALTERNATIVAS: PROYECTO
"CONEXI6N TERRESTRE ENTRE COLOMBIA Y PANAMA" [DIAGNOSTIC STUDY OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ALTERNATIVES: PROJECT TO CONNECT COLOMBIA AND PANAMA BY
LAND] 3 (1998) [hereinafter INvtAS]; U.N. Educ., Sci., & Cultural Org. [UNESCO],
Parque Nacional Los Katfos [Los Katfos National Park], http://www.unesco.org/
delegates/colombia/katios.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
17. See GRAN ATLAS, supra note 4, at 29; Brian Mapes et al., Diurnal Patterns of
Rainfall in Northwestern South America. Part I: Observations and Context, 131
MONTHLY WEATHER REV. 799, 801 (Nov. 2003).
18. See GRAN ATLAS, supra note 4, at 34-35.
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the Gulf of Urabd, and near Jurad6 on the Pacific coast. 9
B. Political-Administrative
Panama's Darien Province is divided into two districts
(Chepigana and Pinogana) that both share the international bor-
der. In addition, two EmberA-Wounaan Indian comarcas (autono-
mous administrative regions), Sambi and C6maco, were each
created in 1983 from the two districts mentioned above.20 The
C~maco Comarca shares borders with Colombia, the Kuna Yala
Comarca, and also partially overlaps with the Dari6n National
Park."
Dari6n National Park - created in 1980 - is Panama's largest
protected area with an extension of 579,000 ha - essentially one
third of the province.22 Additionally, it was declared a UNESCO
World Heritage Site in 1981 and a Biosphere Reserve in 1983.23
The protected area extends across the entire international border
of Darien Province but does not include the short international
border of the Kuna Yala Comarca and its Caribbean watershed.
24
The park, home to 2,440 species of flora, contains great biological
diversity and high incidence of endemic species and is certainly
one of the most species-diverse areas in Central America.25
According to some scientists, "Darien forests... [are] the most
diverse ecosystems of tropical America."26
19. See id. at 92.
20. FUNDACION DOBBO YALA, PUEBLAS INDIGENAS EXISTENTES EN LA REPUBLICA DE
PANAMA [EXISTING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA], http://www.
doggoyala.org.pa/pagcuadro.htm (last visited May 1, 2007); CONTRALORfA GENERAL
(Pan.) [COMPTROLLER GENERAL], PANAMA EN CIFRAS: Ai os 1998-2002 [PANAMA IN
STATISTICS: 1998-2002], Map Insert (2003).
21. See Map 1; INSTITUTO GEOGRAFICO NACIONAL "TOMMY GUARDIA" (PANAMA)
["TOMMY GUARDIA" NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC INSTITUTE] , SfNTESIS GEOGRAFICA -
EDICI6N 4 [GEOGRAPHIC SYNTHESIS - 4TH EDITION] (2006).
22. See AUTORIDAD NACIONAL DEL AMBIENTE (PANAMA) [NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AUTHORITY OF PANAMA], LISTADO DE LAS AREAS PROTEGIDAS, SEGIN CATEGORfA DE
MANEJO, SUPERFICIE, ANO DE CREACI6N Y BASE LEGAL: Afqo 2004 [LIST OF PROTECTED
AREAS, CLASSIFICATION, SURFACE AREA, YEAR OF CREATION, LEGAL BASIS, 2004], http://
www.anam.gob.pa/PATRIMONIO/areasprotegidas.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2007);
PANAMANIAN NATIONAL PARKS, supra note 8, at 102-03.
23. See World Heritage Sites: Darign, supra note 1 (stating that prior to the
national park designation on Aug. 7, 1980 by Executive Decree no. 21, 700,000 ha of
the same area had been declared the Alto Darien Protective Forest in 1972 by
Executive Decree no. 84).
24. See Map 2; PANAMANIAN NATIONAL PARKS, supra note 8, at 8-9, 102-03.
25. Centers of Plant Diversity, Middle America & Caribbean Islands, http://www.
nmnh.si.edu/botany/projects/cpd/ma/ma20.htm (follow hyperlink at Darien region of
map) (last visited Feb. 25, 2005).
26. See World Heritage Sites: Darign, supra note 1.
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Map 1 - Map of the Daridn (Panama) - Choc6 (Colombia) border region. The map
indicates the border municipalities and the two principal proposed routes for the Pan-
American Highway across the Darien Gap.
Four municipalities (Jurad6, Rio Sucio, Ungufa, and Acandi -
from west to east) form the international border in Colombia's
Choc6 Department.27 Jurad6 belongs to the Pacific Coast subre-
gion while the other three municipalities (Rio Sucio, Ungufa,
Acandi) comprise the Lower Atrato subregion, also referred to as
Urabd chocoano.2"
Los Katios National Park in Colombia is adjacent to Dari6n
National Park and was created in 1974.29 Its original area of
52,000 ha was expanded to 72,000 in 1979 to protect the riparian
27. See Map 1; OBSERVATORIO DEL PROGRAMA PRESIDENCIAL DE DERECHOS
HuMANos Y DIH [OBSERVATORY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAM FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DIH], MUNICIPIOS Y SUB-REGIONES DEL CHOCO [MUNICIPALITIES AND SUB-REGIONS
OF CHOC6], http://www.derechoshumanos.gov.co/observatorio/04_publicaciones/04_
03_regiones/choco.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Presidential Human
Rights Program].
28. See id.
29. See Map 2; UNEP, Protected Areas and World Heritage, Los Katios National
Park, http://www.unep-wcmc.org/sites/wh/katios.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2007)




Map 2 - Map of the Dari6n (Panama) - Choc6 (Colombia) border region. The map
indicates the two national parks in the region and the two principal proposed routes
for the Pan-American Highway across the Darien Gap.
forest of the Atrato River and adjacent Tumarad6 swamps.3 ° Due
to its location on the land bridge between North and South
America, this park is the only area in South America where Cen-
tral American species exist. 1 Inscription of Los Katios National
Park on the World Heritage List occurred in 1994.32
In addition to the Los Katios National Park, another manage-
ment area also exists in the Choc6 border region. The Natural
Resource Institute (INDERENA) declared the Darien Forest
Reserve of 61,973 ha in 1977."3 This reserve is located on the
Colombian-Panamanian border in the mountains of the Serrania
del Daridn in the municipalities of Acandi and Unguia14 The area
30. Id.; Girot, supra note 5, at 172, 174.
31. See World Heritage Sites: Los Katios, supra note 29.
32. Id.
33. See Acuerdo de Inderena no. 09 de 1977 aprobado por la Resoluci6n no. 36 de
1977 del Ministerio de Agricultura, Resoluci6n no. 1225 de 1977 (containing
INDERENA's legal authority for the creation of the Darien Forest Reserve).
34. See RESERVAS FORESTALES PROTECTORAS NACIONALES DE COLOMBIA: ATLAS
BAsico [NATIONAL FOREST PROTECTIVE RESERVES OF COLOMBIA: BAsIC ATLAS] 120-21
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includes small agricultural communities and native lands
(resguardos) and has been greatly impacted by deforestation. 5 A
special management area designated the Darien Special Manage-
ment Area (Area Especial de Manejo del Darign, AME-D) covers
about 500,000 ha of lands in the border municipalities to facilitate
special management consideration by the Regional Autonomous
Development Corporation of Choc6 (CODECHOCO) 6 This spe-
cial management area includes native lands (resguardos), Los
Katfos National Park and buffer zone, private reserves, the
Dari6n Forest Reserve, as well as land adjudicated to Afro-Colom-
bian communities. 7
C. Ecology
The Dari6n-Choc6 region is the center of the Choc6 Biogeo-
graphical Province, recognized as one of the world's rich and most
diverse areas in terms of biological diversity.38  Its ecosystems
include tropical humid forests, premontaine humid forests, river-
ine swamp forests (cativales), mangrove forests, and freshwater
wetlands. 9 Recently, scientists have included the Choc6/Dari6n
Biogeographic Region on a list of the world's twenty-five "biodiver-
sity hotspots" - areas of exceptional endemism that are highly vul-
nerable to habitat loss.4" The international environmental
organization - Conservation International - lists the Tumbes-
Choc6-Magdalena region as one of its global biodiversity hot-
spots.41 This larger region subsumes the Panama-Colombia bor-
der region (Dari6n-Choc6) that this environmental organization
35. See id.
36. See Parques Nacionales Naturales de Colombia [Colombian Natural National
Parks], Area de Manejo Especial Darien [Darien Special Management Area], http:l!
www.parquesnacionales.gov.co/organiza/dt norocc/Ame%20Dari%C3%A9n%5CAmel
.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2007).
37. See JUAN RODRIGO VEGA HENAO, DIAGNOSTICO SOCIOPOLTICO DEL MANEJO DE
ECOSISTEMAS EN ZONA DE FRONTERA EN COLOMBIA: ESTUDIO DEL CASO DE LA
FRONTERA COLOMBO-PANAMEI&A [SocIO-POLITICAL STUDY OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
IN THE COLOMBIAN BORDER ZONE] 36 (Universidad Nacional de Colombia 2006).
38. See INvIAS, supra note 16, at 14-15.
39. See Conservation Int'l, Biodiversity Hotspots: Tumbes-Choc6-Magdalena,
http://www.biodiversityhotspots.org/xp/Hotspots/tumbeschoco/index.xml (last visited
Feb. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Hotspots: Tumbes-Choc6-Magdalena]; GRAN ATLAS, supra
note 4, at 35, 138; NATIONAL ATLAS OF THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA, supra note 6, at 28-
31.
40. See Norman Myers et al., Biodiversity Hotspots for Conservation Priorities, 403
NATURE 853, 854 (2000).
41. See Hotspots: Tumbes-Choc6-Magdalena, supra note 39.
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calls the "Choc6-Dari~n wet and moist forests".42 This area may
contain the most diverse flora in the Neotropics with over 5,000
species of vascular plants.43
D. People - Social Situation and Cultural Diversity
Human populations, trends, and cultural characteristics are
quite similar in Dari6n and Choc6 - reflecting a human geography
that parallels the natural geography.
In Darien Province, Panama, the population has increased
from 26,524 (1980), 43,832 (1990) to 48,530 (2000). 4 Annual pop-
ulation increase 1980-1990 of 6.5 percent compared to a national
figure of 2.9 percent.45 This rapid growth in the 1980s was likely
due to the termination of the Pan-American Highway to Yaviza
and resulting colonization opportunities. 4 The 1990-2000 annual
population growth was only 1.07 percent in Darien - below the
2.19 percent national figure. Colonization slowed with deforesta-
tion and government removal of agricultural subsidies .4  Today,
population densities in the province are a low 2.9 inhabitants/
kn2.
4 8
The population in Choc6 Department, Colombia, in 2003 was
411,844 people.49 Considering the four border municipalities of
Jurad6, Rio Sucio, Unguia, and Acandi, however, the
demographics are very similar to those in Darien Province. The
following table presents populations of these four border
municipalities .50
42. See id.
43. Id. (follow "Unique Biodiversity" hyperlink).
44. CONSULTORfA, supra note 13, 33-34.
45. Id. at 33-34, 37; Daniel Suman, Globalization and Development: Using the
Coastal Area of the Daridn Region of Panama as a Case Study, 2 OCCASIONAL PAPERS
ON GLOBALIZATION 8 (2005) [hereinafter Suman, Globalization].
46. See CONSULTORA, supra note 13, 33-34.
47. See id. at 33-34, 37.
48. The population of Darien Province in 2000 was 48,530 people, and the area of
the province is 16,671 km2. Thus, the population density of the province is a low 2.9
people per square kilometer. See supra text accompanying notes 7 and 44.
49. See DEPARTAMENTO ADMINISTRATIVO NACIONAL DE ESTADISTICA [NATIONAL
ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS] [DANE], COLOMBIA EN CIFRAS
[CoLoMBIA IN STATISTICS] 98 (2004).
50. DANE, XVI Censo Nacional de Poblaci6n y Vivienda - 1993 [16th National
Census of Population and Housing - 1993], http://www.dane.gov.co/files/
investigaciones/poblacionlpoblacion vivienda/ (follow "Poblaci6n_- Colombia.XLS"
hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 25, 2007); Telephone Interview with DANE, in Bogota,
Colombia (Sept. 8, 2006) (notes on file with author) (soliciting census information
contained in XVII Censo Nacional de Poblaci6n y de Vivienda 2005).
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MUNICIPALITY POPULATION (1993) POPULATION (2005)
Jurad6 4,280 5,322
Rio Sucio 28,635 36,240
Ungula 11,666 14,444
Acandi 10,056 11,319
The average annual population increase during the period from
1993 to 2005 in these municipalities ranged between 1.0%
(Acandi) and 2.2% (Rio Sucio) 1
Both Darien and Choc6 have similarly low social indicators
that are far below the national averages for either country. 2 For
example, the 2000 Panama National Census reported that 40.9
percent of homes in Dari6n lacked potable water; 63.2 percent
lacked electricity; 37.9 percent lacked sanitary waste systems; and
22.8 percent of residents were illiterate. Similar statistics for
the nation were 9.2 percent, 18.5 percent, 6.9 percent, and 7.6 per-
cent, respectively. 4 In Choc6 less than 20 percent of the popula-
tion satisfies its basic human needs, and poverty levels exceed 81
percent of the population.5
Despite the region's deficient social conditions, it houses a
rich cultural diversity comprised primarily of three major ethnic
groups: Emberd and Wounaan Indians, Afro-Colombians and
Afro-Darienitas, and Mestizo colonists and immigrants from other
regions of both countries.
1. Emberd and Wounaan Indigenous Peoples
Emberd and Wounaan traditionally lived in riverine commu-
nities and engage in agriculture although in Panama government
policy in the 1970s concentrated them in communities to facilitate
provision of services. 6 Today, they account for 34.6 percent of
51. This calculation averages the population increases in each municipality over
the twelve year period.
52. COLOMBIA EN CIFRAS, supra note 49, at 15, 100 (comparing, for example, the
percentage of people whose basic necessities are not met in Colombia (37.2%) with
those of Choc6 Department (80.4%)). Panama and Darien Province present a similar
contrast between the nation compared to the border province.
53. See CONTRALORfA GENERAL DE LA REPUBLICA [COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
REPUBLIC], CENSos NACIONALES DE POBLACION Y VIVIENDA [NATIONAL POPULATION
AND HOUSING CENSUS] 20-21 (2000); see also CONSULTORtA supra note 13, at 38-39.
54. See id. at 10-11; Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 8-9.
55. See INvIAs, supra note 16, at 16-17; GRAN ATLAS, supra note 4, at 139.
56. REINA TORRES DE ARAIiZ, PANAMA INDfGENA [INDIGENOUS PANAMA] 155, 159-61,
194 (1980); Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 7.
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Darien Province's population.57 As a result of pressure from the
indigenous communities, the Panamanian Government created
two autonomous regions (comarcas) in Darien in 1983 - C6maco
and Sambd .5 s The EmberA - Wounaan General Congress embod-
ies the traditional government of the EmberA - Wounaan.59
Significant numbers of EmberA and Wounaan peoples inhabit
lands that are outside the two comarcas. These collective lands
(tierras colectivas) lack effective native control and are the source
of current conflicts between the indigenous peoples and mestizo
colonists who do not recognize traditional land tenure systems."
About 8.5 percent of Choc6 Department's population is
Indian.61 The Colombian Government recognized the territorial
claims of the Emberd and Wounaan peoples in the Lower Atrato
and Pacific Coast regions through the 1991 Political Constitution
(Arts. 7 & 8) and Law No. 160 of 1994.62 The Colombian Govern-
ment recognizes a type of native land claim, called a resguardo,
which includes a community and surrounding lands.6 3 The num-
ber of Emberi and Wounaan resguardos in Choc6 Department
totals 105 with a population of 33,896 and land area of 1,222,444
ha.64 OREWA (Organizaci6n Regional Emberd Wounana) was
57. CONSULTORIA supra note 13, 40-41.
58. See Zeddy Herrera, Grupos Aborigenes de Panamd [Indigenous Groups of
Panama], http://www.monografias.com/trabajos 14/indigenas-panama/indigenas-
panama.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 2007); Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 7.
59. See KEVIN E. SANCHEZ S. & MARTA DE GERDES, Escuchemos a las Autoridades
Emberd-Wounaan [Let's Listen to the Emberd-Wounaan Authorities] (2006), http://
www.binal.ac.pa/panal/choco/sp/autoridades.php.
60. Alexis Alvarado, Conflicto Socio-Ambiental de las Comunidades de Arimae y
Emberd Puru [Socio-Environmental Conflict in the Emberd Puru and Arimae
Communities], http://www.geocities.comRainForest/4043/conflicto.html (last visited
Mar. 20, 2007); Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 7.
61. See GRAN ATLAS, supra note 4, at 138.
62. See Ley No. 160, De Reforma Agraria y Desarrollo Rural Campesino [Agrarian
Reform and Rural Development], arts. 85-87, Aug. 3, 1994 (Colom.), available at
http://www.incora.gov.co/capitulol4.htm; Girot, supra note 5, at 187.
63. See Fundaci6n Hemera, Los Resguardos Indfgenas, http://www.etniasde
colombia.org/grupos-resguardos.asp (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
64. RAOL ARANGO & ENRIQUE SANCHEZ GUTI1gRREZ, Los PUEBLOS INDIGENAS DE
COLOMBIA EN EL UMBRAL DEL NUEVO MILENIO [THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF COLOMBIA
ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM] Annex 1 (Departamento Nacional de
Planeaci6n, 2004), available at http://www.dnp.gov.co/paginas detalle.aspx?idp=452
(follow "Anexo 1" hyperlink). The legal origins of the resguardo can be traced to the
late 19th Century and Ley 89 of 1890. See Ley No. 89, Por la cual se determina la
manera como deben ser gobernados los salvajes que vayan reducidndose a la vida
civilizada [To Determine the Manner in Which the Savages who are Adapting to
Civilized Life Should be Governed] arts. 14-22 (Nov. 25, 1890) (Colom.).
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formed in the 1980s to defend natives' rights in Choc6 5
2. Afro-Colombian and Afro-Dari6n Peoples
In Panama, the Afro-Darienita population tends to live in
coastal communities and engages in the extraction of natural
resources (timber, fish and shrimp).66 This ethnic group controls
provincial politics.6 7 Many coastal communities in Dari6n (partic-
ularly La Palma, Punta Alegre, Garachin6, Puerto Piha, and
Jaqu6) have large Afro-Colombian populations that have migrated
in search of better economic opportunities, and to escape the polit-
ical violence in their home country.
The situation of the Afro population in Choc6 Department is
similar to that of Darien. The Afro-Colombian population com-
prises the majority of the population - about ninety percent
according to some figures.69 These communities' land tenure is
more complex than Panama's, however. Colombian Law No. 70
(August 27, 1993) created the possibility of collective property
rights for Afro-Colombian communities occupying riverine lands
on the Pacific region.70 The objectives of this landmark legislation
were to protect the cultural identification and community rights of
this ethnic group and to further its social and economic develop-
ment.7' The Colombian Institute of Agrarian Reform (INCORA)
[but today the Colombian Institute of Rural Development -
INCODER] grants the collective titles to communities that
request it. 72 Article 7 stipulates that the collective use of these
lands is "inalienable and non-prescriptive." Lands can be trans-
ferred only to other community members or Afro-Colombians. 73
65. See Girot, supra note 5, at 191; see also Interview with C~sar Monje,
Fundaci6n Natura, in BogotA, Colombia (May 22, 2006) (notes on file with author)
(noting that OREWA was a strong voice for community autonomy and organizations
in Choc6 - even for non-indigenous residents).
66. See Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 7-8.
67. See CONSULTORfA, supra note 13, 40-41.
68. See Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 7.
69. See U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME [UNDP], EL CONFLICTO, CALLEJON CON
SALIDA: [THE CONFLICT, AN ALLEY WITH AN EXIT] 129 (2d ed. 2003) [hereinafter
UNDP, EL CONFLICTO]; see also GRAN ATLAS, supra note 4, at 138 (stating that the
Colombian Government reports that more than 64 percent of the department's
population is Afro-Colombian).
70. See Ley No. 70, Por la cual se Desarrolla el Articulo Transitorio 55 de la
Constituci6n Politica [By Which the Transitory Article 55 of the Political Constitution
is Developed] (27 Aug. 1993) (Colom.).
71. See id., art. 1.
72. See id., arts. 8, 11.
73. See id., art. 7 (translation by author).
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Non-Afro-Colombians who occupy land granted to Afro-Colombian
communities will not obtain legal title.74 The legislation requires
that any commercial use of forests be sustainable and appropriate




The third ethnic group in the region represents the immi-
grants from other regions of the two countries. Mestizos from
Panama's central provinces, known as interioranos, have
migrated to Dari6n over the past twenty years and settled in or
near towns along the Pan-American Highway. Cattle-raising and
rice cultivation are their primary economic activities.7" Entry of
this ethnic group has resulted in land conflicts with the other two
groups because of their different property rights systems. Con-
flicts are particularly severe between interioranos and native peo-
ples, particularly those Emberi who live outside the comarcas
(autonomous administrative areas), and lack title recognition of
their traditional community property.77 Migrants to Dari6n towns
from Colombia's Antioquia Department also play an important
role in business and commerce in that province.7"
A similar immigration situation has occurred in Colombia.
Migration of small farmers from Sucre and C6rdoba departments
to the Urabd area, as well as to lands further west in Choc6, repre-
sents an important situation.79 Many immigrants were initially
attracted to the banana plantations established in the 1960s. s' In
addition, people from Antioquia Department have also entered the
region via the Medellin-Turbo and the Medellin-Quibd6 roads."s
E. Threats and Concerns in the Region
As this article describes below, few roads exist in this border
74. See id., art. 15.
75. See id., art. 6.
76. See Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 15.
77. See CONSULTORfA, supra note 13, 44.
78. See id. at 41.
79. See Napole6n Garcia Anaya, La Solidaridad es la Defensa de las Minorias:
Indigenas y Negros en Medio de la Guerra en el Choc6 [Solidarity is the Defense of the
Minorities: Indigenous Peoples and Blacks in the Middle of the War in Choc6], in
CONFLICTOS REGIONALES - ATLANTICo Y PACIFICO [REGIONAL CONFLICTS - ATLANTIC
AND PACIFIC] 171, 174 (Instituto de Estudios Politicos y Relaciones Internacionales de
la Universidad Nacional, 1998).
80. See Girot, supra note 5, at 177.
81. See id.
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area. The Pan-American Highway ends in Yaviza, Panama, and
only begins again 108 km further (in Lomas Aisladas, Colombia). 2
Government presence in the region has been minimal83 despite the
area's strategic importance as a border region, geographic connec-
tion point between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and North and
South America, and position as a corridor from the interior of
Colombia to the coast.
1. Colonization
The Dari6n-Choc6 region, also know as the "Dari6n Gap", is
an active colonization frontier on-both sides of the international
border. Deforestation occurs as settlers inhabit and clear the
land. The processes in Colombia and Panama are similar,
although those in Colombia are more acute.
In Panama, the construction in the late 1970s of the Pan-
American Highway to Yaviza in the center of Dari6n Province per-
mitted the disorganized influx of colonists from central and west-
ern Panama and stimulated the rapid deforestation of the western
half of Dari6n. 4 A short-lived agricultural era (producing rice,
corn, beans) followed the initial tropical hardwood extraction. 5 As
soil quality degraded, the dominant land use has become exten-
sive (low-density) cattle-ranching.
86
In Colombia, many families originally from other depart-
ments (C6rdoba, Sucre, Bolivar, Antioquia), as well as from the
Alto Atrato in Choc6 Department (upper reaches of the Atrato
Watershed) settled in the Urabd chocoano to the west of the Gulf
of Urabd, particularly in the municipalities of Ungufa and
Acandi. 8 7 Hunters and loggers arrived first, followed by small
farmers and, ultimately in the 1970s, land investors and large
farmers (latifundistas).
88
The road from Medellin to Turbo, on the east side of the Gulf
of UrabA, was completed after World War II and in the subsequent
decades facilitated settlements along the road (Chigorod6,
Apartad6, Dabeiba) that formed new economic centers for the
region. 9 The towns along the Atrato River (Quibd6, Murind6,
82. See Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 15.
83. See Girot, supra note 5, at 192.
84. See CONSULTORfA, supra note 13, at 11-15; Girot, supra note 5, at 184.
85. See CONSULTORfA, supra note 13, at 11-15.
86. See id.
87. See Anaya, supra note 79, at 174.
88. See id.
89. See Girot, supra note 5, at 177.
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Arqufa, Pavarand6) stagnated from the 1950s forward.90 The road
also stimulated the entry of new capital into the region, particu-
larly the banana plantations around the Gulf of Urabd.91
Colonization pressure has extended to the areas to the west of
the Atrato River near Los Katios National Park, largely due to
ranchers and farmers displaced by the plantation crisis in Urabd
and the political violence.92
2. Timber Extraction
In Panama, the western half of Dari6n Province was largely
deforested during the past twenty-five years after the opening of
the Pan-American Highway to Yaviza.93 Significant logging of
tropical hardwoods continues today in the C6maco Emberd
Comarca and even within Darien National Park.94 Commercial
logging largely occurs today via an often-abused loophole in the
Forestry Law that allows "subsistence use" of forest products by
Native peoples. 95
The rich forest resources in Choc6 Department have been a
target of large forestry exploitation for over fifty years. The intro-
duction of mechanized techniques in the 1960s by logging compa-
nies, such as Pizano, S.A. and Maderas del Dari6n, especially
targeted the cativo forests adjacent to major river courses.96 These
woods are largely used for triplex and particle-board for the furni-
ture and construction industries. 97 The result has been the sub-
stantial reduction in fine tropical hardwoods and cativo in Choc6,
as well as severe ecosystem impacts. Conflicts between timber
companies and Afro-Colombian communities with collective title,
as well as Emberd resguardos are common.9" Recently, as
paramilitary groups have extended their control of Choc6, displac-
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 178.
93. See Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 12.
94. See id.
95. See id.; Ley No. 1, Por la cual se Establece la Legislaci6n Forestal en la
Repfiblica de Panamd y se Dictan Otras Disposiciones [Through Which the Forestry
Law in the Republic of Panama is Established and Other Arrangements are Set
Forth], art. 27(1) (Feb. 3, 1994) (Pan.).
96. See Eduardo Veja et al., Agroindustrias, Explotaci6n Forestal y Violencia en el
Bajo Atrato [Agroindustry, Deforestation and Violence in the Lower Atrato], REviSTA
SEMILLAS, Dec. 2005, at 40.
97. See id. at 41.
98. See Benjamin Castafho, Las Politicas Gubernamentales Sobre Incentivos
Forestales [Governmental Politics On Forestry Incentives], REVISTA SEMILLAS, Aug.
2003, at 13-14.
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ing traditional communities, a new forest extraction model has
developed.99 The paramilitary land occupiers also extract large
quantities of tropical hardwoods from these areas.100 In other
cases, large timber and agroindustry companies have approached
displaced community members offering to facilitate the bureau-
cratic steps necessary to obtain collective title, forming associa-
tions with the companies but actually gaining permission to log
collective lands.10'
3. Mega-Projects
Large-scale development projects in this region may not be far
off. The Colombian Government and private investors have pro-
posed a number of large projects including construction of the
Pan-American Highway through to Panama, secondary depart-
mental roads, an inter-oceanic canal, a deepwater Pacific port in
TribugA, large agricultural projects, a Colombia-Panama electric
transmission route, gas pipelines, and hydroelectric dams.0 2 All
these potential projects would have major regional environmental
and social impacts.
The Panamanian Government's plans for Dari6n are not quite
as pharaonic as Colombia's. The government recently refurbished
its section of the Pan-American Highway to Yaviza and invested
in a multi-sectoral development project called the Program for the
Sustainable Development of Dari6n (PDSD), financed largely with
loans from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 10 3 Its
goals are to improve delivery of social services to Dari6n,
99. See Veja, supra note 96, at 41.
100. See id.
101. See Comisi6n Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz, lEcocidio Certificado?: Pizano
S.A. en el Territorio del Bajo Atrato (Choc6) [Certified Ecocide: Pizano S.A. in the
Territory of the Bajo Atrato (Choc6)], REVISTA SEMILLAS, Dec. 2005, at 45-46; Comisi6n
Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz, Pena de Muerte a Bosques y Afrocolombianos [Death
Penalty for Forests and Afro-Colombians], Dec. 16, 2005, http://www.
peaceobservatory.org/index.php?id=211; Comisi6n Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz, La
Tramoya: Derechos Humanos y Palma Aceitera Curvarad6 y Jiguamiand6, Caso Tipo
5 [La Tramoya: Human Rights and African Palms, Curvarad6 and Jiguamiand6,
Case Study Number 5] (Oct. 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter La Tramoya].
102. See Uribe: Colombia Seeks Continental Integration, Bus. NEWS AMERICAS, July
19, 2006, available at http://www.peaceobservatory.org/index.php?id=574; GRUPO DE
INTEGRACI6N, LA INSERCI6N DE COLOMBIA EN EL SISTEMA INTERNACIONAL CAMBIANTE,
POLICY PAPER 14: LA AGENDA INTERNA Y EL PLAN PUEBLA PANAMA 6-7 [GROUP OF
INTEGRATION: THE INTEGRATION OF COLOMBIA IN THE EVOLVING INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM: POLICY PAPER 14: THE INTERNAL AGENDA AND THE PLAN PUEBLA PANAMA]
(May 2005) [hereinafter POLICY PAPER 14], http://www.colombiainternacional.org/
DOC%20PDF/Policy%20paper- 14.pdf.
103. See Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 1.
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strengthen local government capabilities, encourage land use
planning, and improve transportation infrastructure. 0
4. Political Violence
The Colombian portion of the region has become a "hotspot" in
that nation's civil war, and the civilian population has suffered
most due to violence originating from all involved parties. Until
the late 1980s Choc6 remained at the margin of Colombian vio-
lence. However, the situation changed, stimulated by the expan-
sion of capital via large-scale banana and African palm
plantations particularly around the Gulf of UrabA, as well as tim-
ber extraction companies. 15
The roots of political violence in Choc6 begin in the Urabi
region, surrounding the Gulf of Urabd on the southwestern corner
of the Caribbean Sea and adjacent to Panama. 106 In the 1980s,
narco-traffickers from Antioquia began to purchase lands near the
Gulf of Urabd in Acandi and Unguf a municipalities. Conflicts also
arose over border areas of the Pacific coast in Jurad6 municipal-
ity, important as well for drug shipments to the United States. 10 7
Additionally, beginning around 1960, the United Fruit Com-
pany began banana production in Urabd.' ° Today over 400 small
banana plantations with more than 300 owners oversee the pro-
duction.0 9 Banana workers' unions grew stronger and more active
in the 1980s (particularly Sintagro and Sintrabanano) in their
demands for improved labor conditions.' 0 Leftist political move-
ments, associated with armed insurgent groups (Fuerzas Armadas
104. UNDP, VISI6N DARIAN: LA GESTI6N DEL DESARROLLO EN LA REGION DE DARIEN
A TRAV8S DE PROGRAMAS Y PROYECTOS [DARI9N'S VISION OF DEVELOPMENT
ADMINISTRATION IN THE DARI9N REGION THROUGH PROGRAMS AND PROJECTS] 16, PAN/
01/003 (2003), available at http://www.mef.gob.pa/programadarien/vision%20Darien/
documentos.htm (click on PDF file for this title).
105. See Darfo Fajardo Montafia, Tierra, Territorios y Desplazados [Land,
Territories, and Displaced Persons], REVISTA SEMILLAS, June 2005, at 10-15.
106. See UNDP, EL CONFLICTO, supra note 69 (stating that Colombians refer to the
area as the "Colombian Daridn", and that it includes portions of the departments of
Choc6, Antioquia, and C6rdoba).
107. See PROGRAMA PRESIDENCIAL DE DERECHOS HuMANos [PRESIDENTIAL PROGRAM
OF HUMAN RIGHTS] (Colom.), PANORAMA ACTUAL DEL CHOC6 [CURRENT PANORAMA OF
CHOc] 3 (2003) [hereinafter CURRENT PANORAMA OF CHOC6], available at http://www.
derechoshumanos.gov.co/observatorio/04_publicaciones/04_03_regiones/choco.pdf.
108. CENTRO DE INVESTIGACION Y EDUCACION POPULAR [CENTER FOR INVESTIGATION
AND POPULAR EDUCATION] [CINEPI, URABA: INFORME DE LA COMISION VERIFICADORA
DE LOS ACTORES VIOLENTOS EN URABA [URABA: REPORT OF THE VERYFIYING
COMMISSION ON VIOLENT ACTORS IN URABA] 14 (1995) [hereinafter URABA].
109. See id.
110. See id. at 16.
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Revolucionarias de Colombia [FARCI and Ejdrcito Popular de
Liberaci6n [EPLI), led these organizations."' The left also con-
trolled local governments in the region at that time.112
During the 1980s, and particularly after the 1991 demobiliza-
tion of the EPL and its members' "reinsertion" into civilian life,
the FARC, especially Front 57, occupied the political space in
northern Choc6 along the Panamanian border, east of the Ser-
rania del Darign, and on the west bank of the Atrato River. 1 3 This
border area was of great strategic importance to the FARC as an
entry point for arms and munitions into Colombia and a safe zone




A response from the right and its paramilitary forces, how-
ever, was forthcoming. The paramilitary groups are essentially
private counterinsurgency armies supported by cattle ranchers,
owners of banana plantations, and businessmen with broad par-
ticipation and support from the National Police and Army. The
paramilitary group AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia -
Colombian Self-Defense Forces) moved into the banana zone in
Urabd from its strongholds to the east around 1995 to attack
FARC zones, as well as because of the strategic importance of the
region for arms supplies and drug shipments."' The years 1996-
1997 and 2002 were peak periods for civilian murders and kidnap-
ping in the Acandf, Unguia, and Rfo Sucio municipalities." 6 More-
over, this paramilitary push attempted to stop the process of
granting of land titles to Afro-Colombian communities that had
begun in the zone as a result of Law No. 70."1 In a sense, this was
an agrarian counter-reform sponsored by large cattle ranchers,
agroindustry, timber interests, and commercial interests."8
111. See id.; see also Clara In~s Garcia, Urabd: Cruce o Articulaci6n de Conflictos?
[Urabd: Crossroads or Articulation of Conflicts?], in CONFLICTOS REGIONALES -
ATLANTICO PACfFICO [REGIONAL CONFLICTS - ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC] 99-106 (Instituto
de Estudios Politicos y Relaciones Internacionales de la Universidad Nacional, 1998).
112. See Una Subregi6n con 26 Afios en Medio de la Guerra [A Subregion with 26
Years in the Midst of the War], EL ESPECTADOR (Colom.), May 21-27, 2006, at 2A.
113. See URABA, supra note 108, at 23; Anaya, supra note 79, at 175.
114. See CURRENT PANORAMA OF CHOCO, supra note 107; URABA, supra note 108, at
23.
115. See URABA, supra note 108, at 31; FERNAN E. GONZALEZ ET AL., VIOLENCIA
POLTICA EN COLOMBIA: DE LA NACION FRAGMENTADA A LA CONSTRUCCI6N DEL
ESTADO [POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA: FROM A FRAGMENTED NATION TO THE
CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATE] 124 (CINEP, 2003); Garcia, supra note 111, at 107;
Anaya, supra note 79, at 176.
116. See Presidential Human Rights Program, supra note 27, at 10.
117. See GONZALEZ, supra note 115, at 141.
118. See id. at 141-42; UNDP, EL CONFLICTO, supra note 69, at 75.
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By the late 1990s until 2003, lands further to the west in the
strategic Choc6 Department became a battle ground between left-
ist guerrillas from the FARC and right-wing AUC paramilita-
ries.119 Civilians were caught in the middle of the generalized
violence between the FARC and Esperanza, Paz y Libertad (Hope,
Peace, and Liberty) (demobilized guerrillas of the EPL) [1991-
1994], the FARC and paramilitary AUC, and the FARC and
National Police and Army.12° This dirty war involved techniques
against the civilian populations suspected of collaboration with
opposing groups, such as selective murder, collective threats and
displacement, kidnapping, and collective murder.'21 In many
areas of Choc6, the paramilitary's strategy appeared to involve
"cleansing" a region of any type of social organization.'22 The
impoverished Afro-Colombians and Native peoples in Choc6 have
suffered the most during these two decades of violence.
12 3
One byproduct of the years of political violence, drug traffick-
ing, and the growth of latifundios in northern Choc6 has been
forced displacement of communities and individuals.'24 Although
exact numbers of refugees do not exist, an estimated 50,000 people
have been displaced from their homes in Choc6 Department
between 1996 and 2001.125 Incursions of paramilitary forces,
FARC guerrillas, and the military have displaced people from Rio
Sucio, Jurad6, Cacarica, Unguia, and Acandi - all close to the
Panamanian border.'26 Choc6 refugees have relocated to other
towns in Choc6, other areas of Colombia, or to neighboring Pan-
ama. Over 20,000 people, of whom ninety percent were Afro-
Colombians, were expelled from Rio Sucio in 1996.127 Over 7,000
people - the majority of the town's population - fled political vio-
lence in Jurad6 in December 1999.128
119. See GONZALEZ, supra note 115, at 134; see also Presidential Human Rights
Program, supra note 27, at 6-10.
120. See URABA, supra note 108, at 40-41.
121. See GONZALEZ, supra note 115, at 124; Garcia, supra note 111, at 107.
122. See GONZALEZ, supra note 115, at 124; Garcia, supra note 111, at 108.
123. See GONZALEZ, supra note 115, at 124.
124. See URABA, supra note 108, at 40-41; Presidential Human Rights Program,
supra note 27.
125. Voces de aliento y compromiso: Organismos humanitarios y no
gubernamentales [Voices of Hope and Compromise: Humanitarian Organizations and
NGOs], in FoRJAmos ESPERANZA: AFRODESPLAZADOS [WE BUILD HOPE: DISPLACED
PERSONS OF AFRICAN DESCENT], 58 (La Asociaci6n de Afrocolombianos Desplazados
[AFRODES], June 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter Voces de Aliento].
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Choc6: Desintergs Oficial y Desintegraci6n Comunitaria [Choc6: Official
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The impact of violence in Choc6 on EmberA peoples has also
been particularly severe.i2 9 Reports indicate that almost one quar-
ter of the Katfo EmberA (living west of the Atrato River near Los
Katios National Park) has been displaced.13 ° This figure is nine
times the national average of displaced people. 31 The suffering
and humanitarian crisis of the Emberi and Afro-Colombian com-
munities in Choc6 remains largely invisible to the world commu-
nity - "our deaths aren't news" ("nuestras muertes no son
noticia").32 Some commentators have noted the irony of the Choc6
situation - the area's rich biodiversity and, at the same time, the
extermination and displacement of many of its human
residents.133
The Uribe Administration's policy of demobilization of
paramilitary forces (DDR - Disarmament, Demobilization, and
Reincorporation)'34 has yet to be fully felt in Choc6. Some indices
reflect that murders have decreased in paramilitary zones in
Choc6 but that kidnappings have increased significantly. 3 ' How-
ever, the last paramilitary front to be demobilized is based in
northern Choc6 (Acandi), so the violence has tended to continue
longer there than in areas where demobilization occurred ear-
lier. 36 Moreover, most of the demobilized "paras" remain in the
Disinterest and Community Disintegration] in FoRiAMos ESPERANZA: AFRO-
DESPLAZADOS [WE BUILD HOPE: DISPLACED PERSONS OF AFRICAN DESCENT] 16-17
(AFRODES, June 2001) [hereinafter Choc6: Official Disinterest].
129. See generally ORG. OF AM. STATES, INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, CH. X - THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLE (1999), http://www.cidh.org/
countryrep/colom99enlchapter-10.htm (reporting on the situation of indigenous
Colombians, including those in the Choc6 Department) [hereinafter INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS].
130. See William Villa, Violencia Politica Contra Los Pueblos Indigenas en
Colombia (1974-2004) [Political Violence against Indigenous Groups in Colombia],
REVISTA SEMILLAS, June 2005, at 21-26.
131. See id.
132. See Anaya, supra note 79, at 180.
133. Id. at 171-72 ("Parad6jicamente, en la regi6n del mundo con mayor
biodiversidad pasaron a estar en peligro de extinci6n los pueblos pobres.").
134. See Andrea GonzAlez Pefia and Jorge Alberto Restrepo, Desmovilizaci6n de las
AUC: Mayor Seguridad Humana? [Demobilization of the AUC: Better Human
Security?], UN PERI6DICO, May 21, 2006, at 8 (a publication of the Universidad
Nacional de Colombia).
135. See id.
136. See Consultoria para los Derechos Humanos y el Desplazamiento [CODHES],
Cruce de Fronteras, Salida Compleja [Frontier Junction: A Complex Outcome], Jan. 2,
2004, available at http://www.acnur.org/pais/docs/259.pdf (stating that the last
paramilitary group to demobilize under President Alvaro Uribe's plan was the Block
Ielmer Cirdenas (BEC) in northern Choc6 Department). This process occurred in two
phases in 2006). See also ALTO COMISIONADO PARA LA PAZ, REVELA ACERCAMIENTOS
CON BLOQUE ELMER CARDENAS PARA POSIBLE DESMOVILIZACION [HIGH COMMISSION FOR
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region and continue to threaten the local populations.137 Many of
these demobilized forces continue to accumulate lands for cattle
ranches, African palm plantations, and eco-tourism projects at the
expense of the traditional poor inhabitants. 138 Reports continue of
illegal armed groups continuing to pressure residents to sell their
lands with statements such as "if you won't sell it to us, we'll buy
it from your widow". 39 Thus, while Colombian political violence
may be decreasing nationwide, business as usual continues in
Choc6.14 °
5. Extension of the Latifundios
Not divorced from the political violence in northern Choc6 is
the violence that has resulted from the extension of agroindustry
(extensive cattle-raising, banana and African palm plantations),
as well as the interest in accumulating land in a region that might
be the site of mega-development projects. The principal factor
behind this violence, human suffering, and resulting displacement
of populations of Afro-Colombians and native peoples has been the
struggle for land.' Concentration of lands dedicated to the
PEACE REVEALS CLOSENESS WITH OUTREACH TO ELMER CARDENAS BLOCK FOR POSSIBLE
DEMOBILIZATION] (July 14, 2005), http://www.altocomisionadoparalapaz.gov.co/
noticias/2005/julio/jul_14_05d.htm; INSTITUTO LATINOAMERICANO DE SERVICIOS
LEGALES ALTERNATIVOS [LATIN-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF ALTERNATIVE LEGAL SERVICES]
[ILSA], EN PLENA DESMOVILIZACION, 'PARAS' DEL BLOQUE ELMER CARDENAS SIGUEN
APROPLANDOSE DE FINCAS [IN TOTAL DEMOBILIZATION, PARAMILITARIES OF THE ELMER
CARDENAS BLOCK CONTINUE EXPROPRIATING FARMLANDS] (June 12, 2006), http://www.
ilsa.org.co/article-imprim.php3?idarticle=229 [hereinafter ILSA].
137. See INT'L PEACE OBSERVATORY [IPO], MORE FAMILIES FLEE UNREST NEAR
COLOMBIA'S NORTHERN BORDER WITH PANAMA (Aug. 2, 2006), http://www.
peaceobservatory.org/index.php?id=772 [hereinafter FAMILIES FLEE].
138. See Enrique Rivas, Urabd Feudal [Feudal Urabd], EL ESPECTADOR, May 21-27,
2006, at 2A; see also ILSA, supra note 136. The paramilitary Block Rlmer C~irdenas
conditioned its recent demobilization on the government's support of its agroindustry
and African palm cultivation. Lands of interest to "paramilitary agroindustrialists"
are often those that they obtained by force and intimidation from Afro-Colombian
communities. See also BRUNO MATAPAY, AGENCIA PRENSA RURAL [RURAL PRESS
AGENCY], LA DESMOVILIZACION DEL BLOQUE ELMER CARDENAS - EL SHOW DEBE SEGUIR
[THE DEMOBILIZATION OF THE ELMER CARDENAS BLOCK - THE SHOW MUST Go ON]
(Aug. 12, 2006), http://www.prensarural.org/spip/spip.php?articlel7 [hereinafter
MATAPAY]; Carlos Salgado, Sin Fe, se Espera que el BEC Devuelva Tierras [Without
Faith, Hope Exists that the BEC Will Return Lands], EL COLOMBIANO, available at
http://www.elcolombiano.com.co/BancoConocimiento/S/sin fe-se-espera-que-el bec-
devuelva-tierras/sin fe se-espera.que el bec devuelva tierras.asp?CodSeccion=7.
139. See Rivas, supra note 138 (stating that some observers of the Choc6 situation
consider that the paramilitaries' principal interest in the region was obtaining land
and that fighting the FARC was merely an excuse for the land grab).
140. See FAMILIES FLEE, supra note 137.
141. See Garcia, supra note 111, at 96; Amnesty Int'l, Colombia: The Right to Live
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above-mentioned activities limits jobs, utilizes the "best" lands,
and forces small farmers to colonize and deforest new areas. 62
Investors, supported by paramilitary forces, have attempted
to gain control of lands held in collective title by Afro-Colombian
communities made possible via Law No. 70.143
Accompanying the increase in the influence of the paramili-
tary forces in Lower Atrato region is an increase in the cultivation
of African palm. Colombia today is the largest producer of African
palm in the Western Hemisphere and the fourth largest in the
world, and Choc6 is considered to be a prime area for expansion of
this crop.'44 In recent years, palm plantations have increased on
"collective territorial" lands of Afro-Colombian communities. New
investors are able to obtain private land titles for collective terri-
torial lands through political pressure of claims of existing titles,
illegal agreements with communities or individuals, or simple
fraud. 145 One result of what appears to be official strategy is the
displacement of traditional Afro-Colombian communities followed
by the subsequent entry of agroindustry and large investors.146
These outside interests are imposing exogenous development
models on lands, which until now, were occupied by Afro-Colom-
bian and Indian peoples.
One particularly egregious example of this policy is that of the
Afro-Colombian communities of Curvarad6 and Jiguamiand6.141
Since the presence of the AUC in 1996, many members of these
communities have opted to abandon their homes for their own
safety.14 8 Upon returning to their communities, they discovered
African palm plantations occupying their former lands.4 9 Those
people who remained were often illegally forced to sell their lands
at Home, Al Index AMR 23/043/2000 (June 20, 2000), available at http://web.amnesty.
org/library/print/ENGAMR230432000.
142. See id. at 96-97.
143. See Voces de Aliento, supra note 125, at 58; see also Veja, supra note 96, at 38-
39; La Tramoya, supra note 101, at 13-15, 93-95.
144. See Grupo Semillas, Palma Africana en los Territorios de las Comunidades
Negras de Jiguamiand6 y Curvarad6, Choc6 [African Palm in the Lands of Black
Communities of Jiguamiand6 and Curvadar6, Choc6], REVISTA SEMILLAS, June 2005,
at 28-33 [hereinafter Palma Africana].
145. See id.; La Tramoya, supra note 101, at 95-111.
146. See Palma Africana, supra note 144, at 28-33.
147. IPO, AVANZA SIEMBRA ILEGAL DE PALMA AFRICANA EN CHOC6 [CULTIVATION OF
AFRICAN PALMS ADVANCES ILLEGALLY IN CHOC6] (Aug. 7, 2005), http://www.
peaceobservatory.org/index.php?id=3; Veja, supra note 96, at 38-39; La Tramoya,
supra note 101, at 95-108.
148. See Ivain Cepeda Castro, Jiguamiand6, EL ESPECTADOR, Aug. 21, 2005, at 19A.
149. See id.
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for extremely low prices.150
Indigenous peoples in Choc6 also experienced similar losses of
their resguardo lands due to occupation of land by settlers or
faulty titles. 5' These land conflicts often are intertwined with
paramilitary activities, as has also occurred with Afro-Colombian
peoples.
15 2
III. HISTORY OF THE PAN-AMERICAN HIGHWAY AND THE
ROAD CONSTRUCTION
Transportation systems are the key to connectivity within
and among nations for the flow of people and goods. 15 3 Roads have
only recently linked Dari6n Province to the rest of Panama.'
Prior to the construction of the road system, connection to Pan-
ama City from Dari6n was primarily via wooden cargo vessels
that sailed from the Municipal Pier in Panama City to the various
Darien riverine and coastal villages.155 Inter-provincial transpor-
tation relied on the extensive river systems. 5 ' Water transporta-
tion still exists today, but the Pan-American Highway moves an
ever increasing share of goods and people between the province
and Panama City. 7
Similarly, the transportation networks in Choc6 Department
are inadequate. The road connecting Medellin to Turbo on the
Gulf of Urabd - actually in Antioquia Department - provides the
existing link for the Pan-American Highway system from Colom-
bia. ' This road was completed after World War II and has cre-
ated similar impacts on the transportation systems in Choc6 as
has the existing highway in Dari6n." '9 No roads exist west of the
Atrato River - except an isolated stretch on the western shore of
the Gulf of Urabd - and no bridge spans this river. 6 ° The road
from Medellin to Quibd6, the capital of Choc6 Department, illus-
150. Rivas, supra note 138, at 2A; Castro, supra note 148; Interview with Enrique
Sdnchez, Eco-Tr6pico, in Bogota, Colombia (May 23, 2006) (notes on file with author)
[hereinafter Sdnchez Interview].
151. See Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, supra note 129, paras. 22-
27.
152. See id.





158. See Girot, supra note 5, at 176-77.
159. See id.
160. See GRAN ATLAs, supra note 4, at 139.
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trates this department's isolation. The 238 km trip can take at
least twelve hours - or possibly several days.'6 '
The history of the potential road link across the Darien Gap is
long. Since the Fifth Inter-American Hemispheric Conference in
1923, the nations of the Western Hemisphere have urged road
connections between their countries. 16 2 The First Pan-American
Highway Congress (COPACA) in 1925 also ratified the importance
of creating a hemispheric road system. 163 The United States real-
ized the strategic importance of the road system during World
War II and was a key force behind the construction of the road
from Texas to Panama through Central America which was finally
completed in its entirety in 1963.11
The 398 km road section between Tocumen just east of Pan-
ama City and the Le6n River near the Gulf of Urabd in Colombia
is known as the Darien Gap. 16 5 About eighty percent of this
stretch is in Panamanian territory and twenty percent in Colom-
bia. Technically, the most challenging portion is the 29 km sec-
tion between Lomas Aisladas and the Atrato River. 6 6 Rainfall is
particularly high in this area, and the unconsolidated soils report-
edly extend up to seventy meters below the land surface.
1 67
A. 1950s Proposals
In 1955, the Executive Committee of COPACA created the
Dari6n Subcommittee, composed of representatives of Colombia,
Panama, and the United States.1 6 This group coordinated design
studies and recommended various alternatives - four in Panama
and nine in Colombia.'69 The major alternatives were 1) a north-
ern route crossing the border at Palo de Letras and eventually
linking to Chigorod6, Colombia (south of Turbo on the Turbo-
Medellin road) and 2) a southern route crossing the border at
Aspav6 at linking Pacific towns in Choc6 Department (Puerto
161. See N~stor Alonso L6pez, Viaje a Choc6: 115 Kil6metros de Abismos,
Derrumbes y Pantanos [The Trip to Choc6: 115 Kilometers of Precipices, Mud, and
Swamps], EL TIEMPO (Colim.), May 21, 2006.
162. See INvlAs, supra note 16, at 2 (1998).
163. See id.; see also TEODORO E. M2NDEZ, EL DARItN: IMAGEN Y PROYECCIONES
[DARItN: IMAGES AND PROJECTIONS] 275 (Instituto Nacional de Cultura, 2004).




168. See Jost E. MOSQUERA, LAS GUERRAS Y Los CONFLICTos DEL DARIN [DARIAN'S
WARS AND CONFLICTS] 182 (Editorial Lealon, 2002).
169. See id. at 185-88; Girot, supra note 5, at 179.
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Mutis / Bahia Solano). 17 ° By 1960, both Colombia and Panama
had agreed that the road would pass the international border at
Palo de Letras. 17' That same year, the Eighth COPACA unani-
mously accepted this route.
17 2
Despite the agreement that the highway would cross at Palo
de Letras, debate ensued in Colombia and in Panama, regarding a
northern route feeding into the Turbo region or a southern route
connecting Pacific coastal areas.17' Backed by U.S. legislation that
supported the project174 and funding of $100 million from the U.S.
Government, construction began in Panama during the 1970s in
Cangl6n in the center of Dari6n (1971-1978)." 5 Panama and
Colombia would respectively allocate an additional $30 million
and $20 million for construction within their territories.'76 In
1974, the U.S. Department of Transportation prepared an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the road project. 7 7 This
document failed to include a full alternative analysis as required
by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).171 The U.S.
agency considered that the 1971 agreement between Colombia,
Panama, and the United States regarding the agreed route obvi-
ated this discussion.1
79
B. Legal Challenge by Environmental Groups in the
United States
In the 1970s, legal action in the United States on NEPA
grounds frustrated the completion of the Pan-American Highway
project.' Concern had developed in the 1960s regarding animal
170. Jose M. REVERTE, Rfo BAYANo: REGI6N DE MANANA [BAYANO RIVER: REGION
OF TOMORROW] 357-78 (Imprenta Nacional 1961); MOSQUERA, supra note 168, at 185-
88.
171. Colombia selected the route El Tigre-Rfo Le6n-Lomas Aisladas-Rfo Atrato-
Palo de Letras. See Law No. 121 (Dec. 3, 1959) (Colom.). Weeks later, Panama
adopted the route Yaviza-Pinogana-Palo de Letras for its portion of the highway. See
Decreto No. 41, (Jan. 13, 1960) (Pan.). Palo de Letras sits at the international border
between the two nations.
172. See INvtAs, supra note 16, at 4; MOSQUERA, supra note 168, at 194-95.
173. See INvAs, supra note 16, at 4; MPNDEZ, supra note 163, at 277-83; MOSQUERA,
supra note 168, at 191-92.
174. See Darien Gap Highway, 23 U.S.C. § 216 (2006).
175. See Sierra Club v. Coleman (Sierra Club injunction), 405 F. Supp. 53, 54
(D.D.C. 1975); MOSQUERA, supra note 168, at 196.
176. See Girot, supra note 5, at 180.
177. See Sierra Club injunction, 405 F. Supp at 54.
178. See id.
179. See MOSQUERA, supra note 168, at 205.
180. See National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000);
see also Sierra Cllub injunction, 405 F. Supp. at 53.
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diseases in Colombia that could potentially spread into Panama
and points north.'81 Foot and mouth disease was the primary con-
cern because Panama, Central America, Mexico, and the United
States were free of the disease while it was widespread through-
out South America.1 2 In the mid-1960s, Panama established cat-
tle inspection and control zones in eastern Panama and actually
prohibited cattle-raising in Dari6n. 183
The disease proved to become the primary obstacle to con-
struction of the road through the Dari6n Gap. Two 1975 NEPA
suits by environmental groups in U.S. District Court in Washing-
ton, D.C., led to an injunction of U.S. funding for the road through
the Darien Gap because of impacts on the ecology of the region
and indigenous peoples.
8 4
The EIS failed to discuss alternatives to the selected shortest
route across the Atrato River through Palo de Letras. s5 The exis-
tence of livest6ck disease - particularly foot and mouth disease -
in cattle in Urabd, Colombia, and its potential spread to Panama
and north were also primary factors cited in the opinion.'86 The
Federal Highway Administration had approved funding for road
planning and construction without preparing an environmental
document that considered potential impacts, such as foot and
mouth disease, and various alternatives to the road.18 7 In the sec-
ond case concerning the extension of the preliminary injunction,
the court noted that "defendants propose to build the first major
highway through a region until now almost wholly undisturbed by
any encroachment of modern civilization, an area by all accounts
constituting an ecosystem virtually unique to the world .... [Nev-
ertheless,] defendants' compliance continues to reflect a minimal-
ist approach to those [NEPA] requirements." 8
The U.S. Department of Transportation appealed the opin-
181. See Sierra Club injunction, 405 F. Supp. at 53; Sierra Club v. Coleman (Sierra
Club injunction extension), 421 F. Supp. 63, 66 (D.D.C. 1976).
182. See id.
183. See MtNDEZ, supra note 163, at 288-89.
184. See Sierra Club injunction, 405 F. Supp. at 53; Sierra Club injunction
extension, 421 F. Supp. 63. The Sierra Club was joined by the National Audubon
Society, Friends of the Earth, and the International Association of Game, Fish, and
Conservation Commissioners in these suits.
185. See Sierra Club injunction, 405 F. Supp. at 55-56; Sierra Club injunction
extension, 421 F. Supp. at 67-68.
186. See Sierra Club injunction, 405 F. Supp. 55; INVIAs, supra note 16, at 4-5;
M9NDEZ, supra note 163, at 291; Girot, supra note 5, at 180.
187. See M9NDEZ, supra note 163, at 291.
188. See Sierra Club extension, 421 F. Supp. at 65.
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ions in 1977, presenting the required EIS that the Batelle Insti-
tute had prepared.189 The appellate court vacated the injunction
and found that the final EIS satisfied NEPA requirements.1 90
Construction of segments in Panama initiated before 1975 were
allowed to continue, but additional segments were conditioned on
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) certification that control
of foot and mouth disease in Colombia was adequate, therefore,
helping prevent the spread of the disease from Colombia to Pan-
ama.191 The two national parks on both sides of the international
border were created as buffer zones at that time (Dari6n National
Park in Panama in 1980 and Los Katios National Park in Colom-
bia in 1974).192
C. Continued Construction after the NEPA Challenge
On August 23, 1979, the Presidents of Panama and Colombia
signed the Declaration of Monterfa, in which they agreed to con-
tinue working to support the construction of the Pan-American
Highway. 9 This proved to be all but impossible without financial
support from the United States.' By 1984, the road extended
twenty-three km further in Dari6n to Yaviza, on the Chucunaque
River.'95 The road remained unpaved for over two decades, creat-
ing transportation difficulties during the rainy season.196 The
opening of Darien to land traffic from the rest of Panama permit-
ted the influx of colonizers and stimulated extensive deforestation
in the western half of the province.
19 7
189. See Sierra Club v. Adams (DOT appeal), 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Girot,
supra note 5, at 180.
190. See DOT appeal, 578 F.2d at 397.
191. See id.; Girot, supra note 5, at 180.
192. See M9NDEZ, supra note 163, at 293.
193. See MOSQUERA, supra note 168, at 210.
194. See id. at 211. The Presidents of Panama and Colombia wrote a joint letter to
U.S. President Ronald Reagan requesting his support for the project. Reagan in turn
responded that it would be impossible to comply, given budget restrictions and limited
interest for the project in the U.S. Congress. See id.
195. See MINISTERIO DE ECONOMfA Y FINANZAS [MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND
FINANCES] (Pan.), UNIDAD DE COORDINACION DEL PROYECTO [UNIT FOR PROJECT
COORDINATION], PROGRAMA DE DESARROLLO SOSTENIBLE DE DARI9N [PROGRAM FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF DARI9N] 6 (Jan. 1999) [hereinafter PROGRAM FOR
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF DARIEN] (stating that even twenty years after its
construction, the road is clearly over-dimensioned. Only 400 vehicles per day pass
over the Darien road, and at least fifty of these are heavy trucks carrying recently
harvested logs). See id.
196. See id., Annex 1. Annex 1 is entitled Plan de Mejoramiento del Servicio de
Transporte de Darign (Plan to Improve Darien Transportation Services).
197. See Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 12.
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The Colombian government continued construction of a 28 km
segment from the Rio Le6n to Lomas Aisladas even without fund-
ing from the U.S. Federal Highway Administration, completing
this final segment in 1983.198 During the 1980s the highway pro-
ject largely disappeared from public debate. No construction has
occurred since that time in either country. Thus, the Pan-Ameri-
can Highway ends today in Yaviza, Panama, and resumes again
108 km later in Lomas Aisladas, Colombia.199
D. Renewed Interest from the Colombian Government
in Construction of the Highway
During the 1980s, the USDA and Colombian Ministry of Agri-
culture implemented a project to control foot and mouth disease in
Choc6 Department.2"' A decade later in 1991, the USDA declared
that Colombia had eradicated foot and mouth disease. 20 1 This
reopened the debate about completing the road through the
Dari6n Gap that apparently would have to pass through both
national parks.2°2
The Departmental Government of Antioquia brought the Pan-
American Highway to the forefront again in 1991.203 In its Depart-
mental Highway Plan, the Antioquia Public Works Secretariat
noted that
the Dari6n Gap - by its location - easily constitutes the
best vehicle for the global projection of this country because
it would open a new international connection with Panama
and its canal, as well as with the countries of Central and
North America.... Regionally its impact in Colombia will
be immense, especially in northwestern Colombia
[Antioquia].204
The 1994 Meeting of the Colombia-Panama Comisi6n de Vecindad
(Commission of Neighbors) considered the highway issue again,
198. See INvfAS, supra note 16, at 5.
199. Ministerio de Transporte, Proyectos de Carreteras con la Reptiblica de
Panamd (Ministry of Transportation, Highway Projects with the Republic of
Panama), http://www.mintransporte.gov.co/Ministerio/Programas/integracion/
proyectos.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2007) (scroll to section D. 1. "Carretera del Tap6n
Dari6n").
200. See INVIAS, supra note 16, at 5; MOSQUERA, supra note 168, at 211-12.
201. See INvfAS, supra note 16, at 5; MOSQUERA, supra note 168, at 211-12.
202. See Peter H. Herlihy, Central American Indian Peoples and Lands Today, in
CENTRAL AMERICA: A NATURAL & CULTURAL HISTORY, 215, 230 (Anthony G. Coates
ed., 1997).
203. See MOSQUERA, supra note 168, at 215.
204. Id. (translation by author).
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and the following year Colombian President Samper requested the
preparation of technical and environmental studies." 5 The envi-
ronmental consulting firms Ecology & Environment, from the
United States, and Hidromec~nicas de Colombia conducted these
studies.206
E. 1996 - Colombian Environmental Consultancy
A recent feasibility study contracted by Colombian govern-
ment20 7 (Invias - Instituto Nacional de Vias) and prepared by Ecol-
ogy and Environment analyzed thirteen alternative routes for the
road. The study concluded that the remaining section of the Pan-
American Highway across the Dari6n Gap was environmentally
and technically feasible.2 ' The recommended route crossing the
border at Palo de Letras passed through both national parks.2 9
The study served as the basis for the Environmental Diagnosis of
Alternatives (DAA - Diagn6stico Ambiental de Alternativas), an
initial environmental document preceding the EIS, as required by
the Colombian Environmental Law.21° The DAA compares the
impacts of various alternatives while the subsequent EIS exam-
ines in detail the impacts of the alternative that the authorities
have selected.211 The study recognized the potential commercial
benefits of the highway to Colombia. The nation's increasingly
globalized economy required improved transportation infrastruc-
205. See INvfAs, supra note 16, at 5.
206. See id. The studies were completed in 1998.
207. Proyecto - Estudio de Invias Muestra 6 Posibles Trazados para una Futura
Carretera [Invias Study Shows 6 Possible Routes for a Future Highway], EL TIEMPO
(Bogotd, Colom.), Nov. 28. 2004, http://colombia.indymedia.orgnews/200412/19861.
php (scroll to area with this title) [hereinafter 6 Possible Routes]. Guillermo Gaviria
was the Director in Invias who signed the consulting contract in 1996. Five years
later, as Governor of Antioquia Department, Gaviria continued to advocate for the
road construction. However, soon after, FARC guerrillas kidnapped and eventually
killed Gaviria, effectively removing the road's strongest spokesman - until the
appearance of President Uribe in 2002. See id.; see also INVIAS, supra note 16, at 9-13,
23, 25; Auto No. 16, 2005 (on file with author) [hereinafter MAVDT]. This document
was issued by the Colombian Ministry of the Environment, Housing, and Territorial
Development, Office of Environmental Licenses, Permits, and Procedures (Ministerio
de Ambiente, Vivienda y Desarrollo Territorial, Direcci6n de Licencias, Permisos, y
Trdmites Ambientes). See id.
208. See INvWAs, supra note 16, at 9-13, 23, 25; MAVDT, supra note 207.
209. See Sara Gallardo M., Panamericana en la Mira [Pan-American Highway
Under Examination], LA PRENSA (Pan.), Jan. 9, 2005, at 5A.
210. See INVlAS, supra note 16, at 7.
211. See Ley 99, art. 56, Dec. 1993 (Colom.), reprinted in SIsTEMA NACIONAL
AMBIENTAL: LEY 99 DE 1993; DECRETO 1753 DE 1994; DECLARACI6N DE Rfo (Eladio
Moreno Moreno ed., Cooperativa Editorial Magisterio 1997).
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ture so that its exports would be more competitive. 212 The road
would also allow Colombia to access the Panama Canal and Pan-
ama's modern port infrastructure, as well as to develop its Central
American markets.213 Were the road to exist, the Colombian Gov-
ernment could improve its delivery of services (security, educa-
tion, health, productive systems, and infrastructure) to
communities in Choc6. 214
The feasibility study characterized the physical, ecological,
and socio-cultural nature of the region; evaluated thirteen alter-
natives for the highway route; and identified potential environ-
mental and social impacts of the project through Choc6.21 5 At the
same time, the documents emphasized that they merely
attempted to identify preliminary issues and recommend a pre-
ferred alternative.2 6 Once the preferred route was identified and
accepted, additional studies would evaluate environmental and
social impacts in depth and attempt to mitigate their adverse
impacts .217
The study's thirteen alternatives for positioning the road rep-
resented three major highway corridors: along the Caribbean
coast and the Gulf of UrabA to the east; through the central zone
of Choc6; and along the Pacific coast.218 The consultants selected
six alternatives for a detailed multi-criteria analysis that included
various environmental and economic factors." 9 The study con-
cluded that the six alternatives did not vary significantly in their
environmental and social impacts.2 0 The primary differences
among the alternatives were the relative costs and, therefore, the
length of the highway.22' The study selected the shortest route of
the six alternatives as the Preferred Alternative with interna-
tional connection at Palo de Letras and endpoints at Yaviza (Pan-
ama) and Lomas Aisladas (Colombia).222 This 148 km route would
bisect both national parks (Dari6n and Los Katios), passes over
the Atrato River and 13 km of adjacent wetlands, cuts through 36
212. See INVLAs, supra note 16, at 6.
213. See id. at 7.
214. See id. at 6.
215. See id. at 20-30.
216. See id. at 25-30.
217. See id. at 9-10.
218. See id. at 20.
219. See id. at 27.
220. See id. at 21-23.
221. See id.
222. See id. at 22, 29-30.
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km of forest, and passes through 35 communities.223 The study
suggested that this route would cause the smallest environmental
impact even though it was routed through both national parks.
224
The projected cost of the Preferred Alternative in 1998 was $231
million.225 Others have suggested a lower cost of $80 million for
Colombia.226
Following this study, individuals in the Colombian power
structure voiced support for the highway and began to express
that its termination was a global necessity. For example, the ex-
director of Invias, Guillermo Gaviria, stated that "[tihis work is
not only important for Antioquia, Choc6, Colombia, and the Amer-
icas, but also for the world."227
F. President Alvaro Uribe's Unilateral Efforts to
Advance the Highway Project
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe's first administration
(2002-2006) signaled a clear change in strategy for completion of
the Pan-American Highway, because the road had emerged as a
priority. The administration based its neo-liberal rationale on
themes of hemispheric, economic, and trade integration, Colom-
bian access to the Panama Canal and Colon Free Zone, and
Colombia's trade potential with Central America and the United
States.228 Uribe's initiatives often appeared personal and unilat-
eral and did not involve joint planning with Panamanian
authorities.229
223. See id. at 27.
224. See id. at 30 (noting that "the majority of parks in the world have roads and in
the Colombian case, it is desirable to strengthen the institutional control of the area
to avoid unwanted colonization.").
225. Id. at 27.
226. See URABA, supra note 108, at 80.
227. MOSQUERA, supra note 168, at 229 (translation by author).
228. See POLICY PAPER 14, supra note 102; Presidencia de la Repfiblica de
Colombia, Palabras del Presidente Uribe en la Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana
[Statement of President Uribe in the University Pontificia Bolivariana] (Apr. 5, 2006),
http://www.presidencia.gov.co/sne/2006/abril/O5/29052006.htm [hereinafter Uribe
University Speech]; M~xico - Presidencia de la Repilblica, Conferencia de Prensa
Conjunta de los Presidentes Vicente Fox y Alvaro Uribe [Joint Press Conference
Between Presidents Vicente Fox and Alvaro Uribel (May 30, 2004), http://fox.
presidencia.gob.mx/actividades/?contenido=8259 [hereinafter Presidential
Conference].
229. See Presidential Conference, supra note 228; Roberto L6pez, Untitled Article,
LA PRENSA (Pan.), Jan. 9, 2005, available at http://biblioteca.prensa.com/contenido/
2005/0109/9-1a-notal.html (quoting the Panamanian Minister of Government and
Justice, who said that "[tihe road has not been a proposal of the Government of
Panamd but only a proposal of Colombia that the Panamanian Government is
580
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The Colombian administration's enthusiasm for the road has
centered on several key themes. Completion of the highway to the
western bank of the Atrato River in Choc6 Department would help
integrate the department into national markets. Highway infra-
structure would promote economic development of the region via
increased exploitation of natural resources (timber) and improved
surface access of Choc6 products (bananas, cattle, timber) to
Colombia's industrial centers.
The highway infrastructure would also permit increased gov-
ernmental presence and provision of services in a troubled region
of Colombia. Occupation of that space and deepening of institu-
tional presence in Choc6 would make it easier to control the
region's many problems, including political violence, drug traffick-
ing, and illegal immigration. 3 0 In January 2005, Colombian
Defense Minister Jorge Uribe stated that opening the Darien Gap
would allow the Colombian government "to exert a stronger con-
trol over persons who act outside the law . . .and allow better
control over arms, money, and drug smuggling."2"1
The road would also facilitate government agencies' efforts to
improve social services, such as health care, education, electricity,
security, and access to markets, as well as the quality of life for
residents of the communities in this isolated department, thus
promoting sustainable development. Many people in the forgot-
ten, poor, and violence-ridden communities of Choc6 anxiously
await construction of the Pan-American Highway that will con-
nect their communities with Panama.2 32 Today's Colombian ter-
minus of the highway is case in point. Residents of Lomas
Aisladas, a poor village of 200 inhabitants only forty miles from
the Panamanian border dream of the day the bulldozers will
arrive and remove them from the "hell" in which they live.233 As a
result of the violence, residents have lost their parcels of land to
"paras" and "narcos.'"234 Although they are fishermen, they do not
analyzing" (translation by author)); Minding the Gap: Panamd and Colombia,
ECONOMIST, Oct. 2, 2004, at 38 [hereinafter Minding the Gap].
230. See Interview with Emersson Forigua, Ministry of Defense, in Bogota, Colom.
(May 23, 2006) (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Forigua Interview] ("The
highway infrastructure will permit control of the Darien territory while the lack of
infrastructure allows negative elements to enter the area.").
231. Roberto L6pez Dubois, Colombia Insiste Hay que Abrir el Tap6n [Colombia
Insists Upon Opening the Gap], LA PRENSA (Pan.), Jan. 5, 2005, at 1A (translation by
author) [hereinafter L6pez, Colombia Insists].
232. See Rivas, supra note 138, at 2A.
233. See id.
234. See id.
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care if a road causeway dams the Tumarad6 Wetlands.235 They
have even changed the name of their village - Lomas Aisladas
(Isolated Hills) - to El Cuarenta (The Fortieth) to remind the gov-
ernment that only forty miles separate them from the Panama-
nian border. 6
Uribe's central arguments, however, focus on the benefits of
increased commerce between Colombia and Panama.237 Colom-
bian exports would benefit from the nearby surface linkage to the
Panama Canal which would provide modern deepwater ports like
Crist6bal, Manzanillo, and Balboa with access to Atlantic and
Pacific destinations.238 The Canal, after all, is a foundation of
international maritime commerce through which four percent of
global trade passes. 23' The highway link would reduce transporta-
tion costs for Colombian exports, allowing them to be more com-
petitive internationally. The international border would be a
short eight hour truck ride to the Panama Canal. Colombia lacks
modern Pacific ports; Buenaventura clearly does not effectively
serve Colombia's maritime requirements in the Pacific Basin.24 °
Perhaps, the absence of modern Pacific ports explains the
extremely low percentage of its foreign trade (three percent) that
Colombia conducts with the Asian Pacific zone.24'
An additional benefit to Colombia of surface access to Panama
would be the Col6n Free Zone, which serves as a major re-exporter
to Latin America of goods, particularly those from Asian produc-
ers, entering Panama via maritime routes.24 2 Re-exported goods
from the Col6n Free Zone to Colombia in 2005 totaled at least
$735.6 million according to the Colombian Ministry of Commerce,
Industry, and Tourism.24 3 The road could significantly reduce
transportation costs to Colombia for these imports. The project
might also alter northern Colombia's export strategies. For exam-
235. See id.
236. See id. Such perspectives are typical of Afro-Colombian communities. See also
Sdnchez Interview, supra note 150.
237. See POLICY PAPER 14, supra note 102, at 8-9.
238. See generally id. at 5-6 (describing Colombian ports).
239. RUBAN SANCHEZ ET AL., SEGURIDADES EN CONSTRUCCI6N EN AMtRICA LATINA,
ToMo 1: EL CfRCULO DE COLOMBIA: BRASIL, ECUADOR, PANAMA, PERO Y VENEZUELA
[SECURITIES UNDER CONSTRUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA: VOL. 1: THE COLOMBIAN CIRCLE:
BRAZIL, ECUADOR, PANAMA, PERU, AND VENEZUELA] 102 (Centro Editorial Universidad
del Rosario, 2005) [hereinafter EL CIRCULO].
240. See POLICY PAPER 14, supra note 102, at 5-6.
241. Id. at 2.
242. See Dustin Guerra, Aumentan Exportaci6n a Colombia [Exports to Colombia
Increase], LA PRENSA (Pan.), May 30, 2006, at 41A.
243. Id.
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ple, Turbo, on the Gulf of UrabA, could become an important
container port for Atlantic departments of Colombia with its road
link to Balboa, Panama's Pacific Port.
Uribe met several times with Panamanian President Mireya
Moscoso (1999-2004) and expressed his interest in the road con-
struction.2" In a November, 2004 meeting between Colombian
President Uribe and the new Panamanian President Torrijos,
Uribe again conveyed his interest in completion of the highway
that would connect the two neighboring countries.245
The Uribe Administration's sights extend further than neigh-
boring Panama. Colombian industry and the United States could
benefit from access to new markets in Central America and the
road would maintain the comparative price advantage of Colom-
bian products. Transportation costs for Colombian exports could
fall dramatically. At the end of his first administration, Uribe ini-
tiated efforts to establish free trade agreements with the Central
American nations, as well as with the United States.246 Adoption
244. See Business & Economy Briefs: Uribe Calls for Road through the Darign Gap,
PANAMA NEWS, Aug. 22 - Sept. 4, 2004, http://www.thepanamanews.com/pn/v-10/
issue_16/businessbriefs.html (scroll down to article); Presidencia de la Repdiblica de
Colombia, Colombia y PanamA Ampliarn Integraci6n Energdtica [Colombia and
Panama Will Increase Energy Integration] (Dec. 18, 2002) http://cne.presidencia.gov.
co/prensa new/sne/2002/diciembre/18/19122002.htm; Lucero Maldonado, Consejos del
Vecino [Neighborly Advice], MARTES FINANCIERO (El Suplemento de LA PRENSA
(Pan.)), Sept. 7, 2004, available at http://www.martesfinanciero/com/history/2004/09/
07/columna/nacionales/3.shtml; El Tap6n del Darign es Nuestro [The Darign Gap is
Ours], REVISTA INSURRECCI6N, Sept. 15, 2004, available at http://colombia.indymedia.
org/news/2004/09/17148.php.
245. See Via / Canciller Dice Que S6lo Hay una Propuesta de Colombia [Chancellor
Says that Colombia Is Merely Offering a Proposal], EL TIEMPO (BogotA, Colom.), Nov.
28, 2004, available at http://colombia.indymedia.org/news/2004/12/19861.php (scroll
down to article).
246. Colombia began negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with three Central
American nations in June 2006. The potential for Colombian exports in Central
American is great. Colombia currently exports $551.7 million annually to Central
Ameirca - a mere 1.3 percent of the region's imports. See Uribe Lanzard TLC con
Centroamdrica [Uribe Will Launch FTA with Central America], LA PRENSA (Pan.),
June 3, 2006, at 29A; RICARDO TRIANA, PRoEXPORT COLOMBIA, OPORTUNIDADES DE
EXPORTACI6N A CENTRO AMPSRICA Y PANAMA [EXPORT OPPORTUNITIES TO CENTRAL
AMERICA AND PANAMA], http://www.mincomercio.gov.co (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
President Uribe's attempt to craft a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United
States has met numerous obstacles. Most recently in early 2007 a U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency report alleged that the head of the Colombian Army collaborated
extensively with Colombian right-wing paramilitary groups including a militia led by
a major drug trafficker. See Paul Richter & Greg Miller, Colombia Army Chief Linked
to Outlaw Militias, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2007, at Al. The fallout from this scandal
involving the Uribe government, known as "paragate", led in April 2007 to the
freezing of U.S. military aid to Colombia under "Plan Colombia", as well as U.S.
Congressional questioning about the future of an FTA with Colombia. See EUA
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of a coveted Free Trade Agreement with the United States argues
for road links to North America. Consolidation of globalization
and increased trade between Colombia and countries in Central
and North America requires a modern transportation infrastruc-
ture.2 47 Thus, land access to Panama would be the key to stimula-
tion of the globalization of the Colombian economy.
The Uribe Administration has also been deeply interested in
the discussions involving the Plan Puebla Panama (PPP).248 The
PPP was officially launched in mid-2001, and it proposed social
development projects for Meso-America.249 Colombia will likely
become an official associate of the PPP during President Uribe's
second administration that began in mid-2006. 2 ° The Plan
attempts to enhance the internal and external links of the
regional economy and promote regional economic integration
through several initiatives. These include the Meso-American
Transport Initiative and the Meso-American Energy Initiative,
which proposes to integrate electric transmission lines.25 I In
December 2005, presidents from Central America, Panama, and
Colombia agreed to link their power grids to reduce the region's
dependency on oil imports.252 The construction of an electric
transmission line between Colombia and Panama across the
Darien Gap is under consideration as an important element of this
initiative.253
The PPP complements the North American Free Trade Agree-
Ret~m Verba Destinada 6 Col6mbia [USA Places Colombian Military Funding on
Hold], FOLHA DE SAO PAULO (Braz.), Apr. 20, 2007, at A17; Al Gore Cancela
Participaci6n en Conferencia por Presencia de Alvaro Uribe [Al Gore Cancels
Participation in Conference due to the Presence of Alvaro Uribe], LA TERCERA (Chile),
Apr. 21, 2007, at 19; Leahy Puts Colombia Aid on Hold, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at
A3.
247. See NAZIH RICHANI, SISTEMAS DE GUERRA: LA ECONOMIA POLITICA DEL
CONFLICTO EN COLOMBIA [SYSTEMS OF WAR: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE CONFLICT
IN COLOMBIA] 226 (Instituto de Estudios Politicos y Relaciones Internacionales,
Universidad Nacional de Colombia 2003).
248. See POLICY PAPER 14, supra note 102, at 1-2; Presidential Conference, supra
note 228; EL CfRCULO, supra note 239, at 106-08.
249. Fernando Arellando Ortiz, Implicaciones del Ingreso de Colombia al Plan
Puebla Panami [Implications of Colombia joining the Plan Puebla Panama], http:/!
www.peaceobservatory.org/index.php?id=586 (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
250. See id.
251. See EL CfRCULO, supra note 239, at 106; POLICY PAPER 14, supra note 102, at 2-
5; Ortiz, supra note 249.
252. See Mike Power, Panama Jungle Power Plan Worries Environmentalists (Dec.
21, 2005), http://www.peaceobservatory.orgindex.php?id=214.
253. See id.; POLICY PAPER 14, supra note 102, at 8. The electric transmission line
will export relatively cheap Colombian power to Panama and then on to Central
America.
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ment (NAFTA)14 and the Central American Free Trade Agree-
ment (CAFTA)25  in facilitating private investment in natural
resources and infrastructure, as well as regional infrastructure
links like transportation links, electric transmission lines, and gas
pipelines. In this context of regional integration, the Pan-Ameri-
can Highway clearly would advance the PPP agenda.256 Panama
would be an operational base for Colombian exports to Central
America. In a May, 2004 meeting with Mexican President Vicente
Fox, Uribe commented that the "[f]irst task [of Colombia once it
formally begins to participate in the PPP will be] construction of
the road that will communicate Colombia to Panama."257 Speak-
ing of the road as a project of "transcendental importance", Uribe
subsequently commented that "Choc6 needs it, Antioquia needs it,
all Colombia needs it, and Central America needs it."
258
Uribe's Pan-American Highway initiative has enjoyed strong
support from the Medellin (Antioquia) industrial sector and the
Antioquia Departmental Government. Uribe, a former Governor
of Antioquia Department himself from 1995 to 1997,259 under-
stands the special interest that these industrial entrepreneurs
have in the highway project. In its Vision of Antioquia in the 21st
Century, Corpes de Occidente proposed the creation of a special
zone in the Colombia-Panama border region, "one of the regions
with the greatest potential for the relocation of [Colombian] export
industries."26 ° Such a projection in favor of the road connection
with Central America is a priority given the new market focus
toward Central and North America that industrialists in north-
west Colombia have embraced.261
The governor of Antioquia Department in 2004, Anfbal
254. See North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec.
17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993).
255. See Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462 (2005), available at http://www.ustr.
gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.
html.
256. See EL CRCULO, supra note 239, at 102; Uribe University Speech, supra note
228.
257. See Presidential Conference, supra note 228 (translation by author); Uribe:
Colombia Seeks Continental Integration, Bus. NEWS AMERICAS, July 18, 2006, http://
www.peaceobservatory.org/index.php?id=574. The road is clearly the top priority in
Uribe's encouragement of integration with Central America.
258. Uribe University Speech, supra note 228 (translation by author).
259. See Juan Forero, '91 U.S. Report Calls Colombian Leader Ally of Drug Lords,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at A6.
260. See MOSQUERA, supra note 168, at 233.
261. Id.
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Gaviria (brother of Guillermo Gaviria, the ex-Director of Invias
and assassinated former governor of Antioquia262 ), also expressed
strong support for the project.2" He considered arguments that
the highway would result in the forest destruction ungrounded,
but also said that the road would permit better governmental con-
trol of the region and reduce illegal activities. 64
G. Evolution of the Preferred Alternative within
Colombian Agencies: Shift in Pan-American
Highway Alternatives to the "Darien Colombiano"
Coastal Route - Unguia & Acandi
Meanwhile, analysis of the alternatives continues today in
various agencies of the Colombian Government. The protracted
debate between Invias, the agency responsible for oversight of
highway planning and construction, and the Ministry of the Envi-
ronment (MAVDT), grantor of the required environmental license,
has continued for eight years.265 On October 28, 1998, Invias sub-
mitted its DAA to the Ministry of the Environment based largely
on the feasibility study prepared by the consulting group Ecology
and the Environment several years earlier.266 Within a month, the
Ministry of the Environment had suspended the process to
request an environmental license for the Pan-American Highway
project and requested additional information and responses to
eighteen questions from Invas.267 The debate between the two
agencies continued for years with administrative challenges and
requests for time extensions and additional information.26
Finally in June, 2005, the Ministry of Environment, Housing, and
Territorial Development (MAVDT - formerly the Ministry of the
Environment) sent the responses it had obtained from Invias to its
various administrative units for evaluation.269 These included the
262. See supra text accompanying note 207.
263. See 6 Possible Routes, supra note 207.
264. See id.
265. See MAVDT, supra note 207; Interview with Blanca Hern.ndez, Sub-Director
of Environment and Social Assessment, Invfas, in Bogotd, Colom. (May 24, 2006)
(notes on file with author) [hereinafter Herndndez Interview]; Interview with Carlos
Alberto Londofio and Juan David Herrera, Directorate of Environmental Licenses,
Permits, and Procedures, Ministry of the Environment, Housing, and Territorial
Development (MAVDT), in Bogota, Colom. (May 22, 2006) (notes on file with author)
[hereinafter Londofio and Herrera Interview].
266. See MAVDT, supra note 207, at 1.
267. See id.; 6 Possible Routes, supra note 207.
268. See MAVDT, supra note 207.
269. See id. at 2.
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Special Administrative Unit for the National Park System, the
Alexander von Humboldt Institute, the Environmental Research
Institute of the Pacific (IIAP), and the Autonomous Regional
Development Corporation for Choc6 (CODECHOCO). 270 Subse-
quently, in September 2005, the Directorate of the MAVDT
responded to Invias.7 1
The concerns from the MAVDT centered on the direct impact
that the road would have on primary forests and on Los Katfos
National Park; the lack of involvement of the Panamanian Gov-
ernment in the planning process; the need to give greater consid-
eration to socio-environmental risks; the greater integration of the
highway project into planning for the sustainable development of
Choc6; and the use of the road project to promote peace, ecological
and social restoration, and community development in the
region.272 The MAVDT generally considered that the DAA should
address these wider issues while the Invfas position was that the
subsequent Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) stage was
the more appropriate vehicle.
During the same period and given the developing opposition
to the Preferred Alternative through Palo de Letras and the
national parks, Invias modified its route proposal, recommending
another alternative (Alternative 5) that would start at Lomas Ais-
ladas, cross the Atrato River bearing to the north, and pass on the
east side of the Gulf of Urabd through the municipalities of
Ungufa and Acandi.2 73 This alternative route, though longer and
more costly, appears to address many of the concerns of the
MAVDT and its various administrative units; it keeps the road
from passing through the center of Los Katfos National Park and
other areas with primary forests. Moreover, one of the most likely
routes for the future electrical transmission line connection
between Colombia and Panama also runs through Ungufa and
Acandi. Contiguous siting of the road and the electric transmis-
sion route might reduce overall environmental impact. In his
recent comments about Colombia's priorities in the PPP, Presi-
dent Uribe also referred to the "coastal route" for the highway con-
necting Colombia and Panama.274 Other Colombian officials refer
270. See id.
271. See id. 3-4.
272. See id.
273. See id.; Londofio and Herrera Interview, supra note 265.
274. See Uribe University Speech, supra note 228; POLICY PAPER 14, supra note
102.
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to this route as a "bi-national development corridor."275 Invias offi-
cials consider that, irrespective of Panama's actions, the road to
Acandi and Ungufa would have independent utility and would
facilitate integration of these regions.276
The MAVDT will base its official selection of a preferred alter-
native on the recommendations of its various affiliated sections
(National Parks Unit, the Ecosystem Directorate, CorpoUrabd,
and the Corporaci6n Aut6noma de Desarrollo Sostenible de
Choc6). 2" The Ministry will develop terms of reference for the
route, and Invias will prepare the EIA.27 8 Upon eventual approval
of the EIA, the MAVDT will grant an environmental license for the
project.279
H. Panamanian Reaction to the Colombian Initiatives
In the recent discussions regarding termination of the Pan-
American Highway, Panama has merely reacted to Colombian ini-
tiatives rather than being an active player in the planning pro-
cess. During the Administration of President Mireya Moscoso8 0
(1999-2004), the Colombian Government advanced the issue
through presidential dialogue, the Comisi6n de Vecindad (Com-
mission of Neighbors), and a 2002 Memorandum of Understand-
ing between the two countries' Ministries of Foreign Relations,
which agreed to promote sustainable development in the border
region."' A high-level Panamanian Ministry of Agricultural
Development official stated that ". . . we shouldn't let the disease
slow down the development of Dari6n Province.""2 ' However, this
official formed part of the Moscoso Administration and does not
represent the current perspective of the Panamanian Government
led by President Martin Torrijos. 23
275. See Londofio and Herrera Interview, supra note 265.
276. See Herndndez Interview, supra note 265.
277. See Londofto and Herrera Interview, supra note 265.
278. See id.
279. See id.
280. President Moscoso's Administration will be remembered for its own
unsuccessful, but dogged, attempt to construct an "ecological road" through Panama's
Volcdn Barii National Park.
281. See MAVDT, supra note 207, at 45.
282. Juan Carlos Diaz, Una Larga Lucha Contra la Aftosa [A Long Fight Against
Foot and Mouth Disease], LA PRENSA (Pan.), June 9, 2001, at 6A (translation by
author).
283. In Panama's May 2004 presidential elections, Martin Torrijos of the
Revolutionary Democratic Party (PRD) defeated several candidates, including Jos6
Miguel Alemdn of the Partido Arnulfista. The right-wing government of Mireya
Moscoso, also of the Partido Arnulfista, occupied the Presidency from 1999 to 2004.
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The new Torrijos Administration (2004-2009) has expressed a
clear lack of support for Uribe's highway initiative, as well as the
absence of a proactive position.2 s4 Olga G6lcher, Vice Minister for
Government and Justice, clarified that "no official policy or plan
exists to support the construction of a road" between Panama and
Colombia.285 Panama's Vice President and Minister of Foreign
Relations Samuel Lewis Navarro stated that Panama would not
open the Dari6n Gap without conducting the required studies that
would analyze environmental, socio-economic, and socio-political
themes."8 6 Panama's official opposition to the project centers on
environmental concerns and the potential environmental impacts
of the road construction, particularly through Dari6n National
Park.2" 7 The current Administrator of Panama's National Envi-
ronment Authority (ANAM), Ligia Castro, stated that "in these
five years (of the Torrijos Administration) there will be no road."288
Panama's largest and most influential environmental organiza-
tion, ANCON, strongly denounced the initiative because it would
aggravate "unplanned colonization, indiscriminate deforestation,
and intentional forest fires ....29
Concern continues to exist in Panama about foot and mouth
disease, which was the original cause for suspension of highway
construction in the 1970s.29° Although Choc6 Department is certi-
The new Torrijos Administration assumed power in September 2004. See El Opositor
Martin Torrijos Gana las Elecciones Presidenciales en Panamd [The Opponent Martin
Torrijos, Wins the Panamanian Presidency], EL MUNDo.Es (Spain), May 3, 2004,
http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2004/05/O3/internacionallO83541264.html; Torrijos
contra Moscoso, Panamd ya tiene nueva Administraci6n [Torrijos Against Moscoso,
Panama Now Has a New Administration], AMIeRICAECON6MICA.COM, Sept. 3, 2004,
http://www.americaeconomica.com/numeros4/281/reportajes/vanesa281.htm.
284. See Minding the Gap, supra note 229.
285. Panamd Se Opone a Abrir Tap6n del Darin [Panama Opposes Opening the
Darin Gap], EL COLOMBIANO.COM (Colom.), Nov. 24, 2004, (translation by author)
[hereinafter Panamd Se Opone].
286. See Cynthia S.nchez, LA PRENSA (Pan.), Nov. 27, 2004, available at http:ll
biblioteca.prensa.concontenido/2004/11l/27/27-5anotal.html. Though Ms. Sdnchez's
article likely included a title in its original publication in La Prensa, the author does
not have the original newspaper in his files. Copies are available only from La Prensa
in Panama. The preceeding web page provides the full text of the article.
287. See Lpez, Colombia Insists, supra note 231; Roberto L6pez, Gobierno Proyecta
Integrar a Daridn [Government Proposes to Integrate Darign], LA PRENSA (Pan.), Jan.
9, 2005, at 1A [hereinafter Lpez, Government Proposes].
288. Panamd Se Opone, supra note 285 (translation by author).
289. Ecologistas Rechazan Construcci6n de Carretera Colombia - Panamd
[Ecologists Reject Construction of the Colombia-Panama Highway], FUNDACION
ECOLOGICA DE COLOMBIA, http://fundacionecologicadecolombia.org/CARRETERA.htm
(translation by author) (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
290. See supra Part III.B.
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fled to be free of the disease, Panama is fearful of the potential
introduction of foot and mouth disease from Colombia into Pan-
ama. Euclides Dfaz, General Secretary of the Panamanian
National Association of Cattle Ranchers (ANAGAN), hypothesized
that the road would allow entry of the disease into Panama and
would "destroy the 85,000 head of cattle in Dari6n."291 The Minis-
ter of Agricultural Development, Laurentino Cortizo, warned that
Panama would have to undertake "a very serious risk analysis
when considering whether to open the Dari6n Gap to avoid devas-
tating consequences for the Panamanian cattle industry."'292
Major concerns for Panama touch on national security issues
related to illegal immigration and border security. An estimated
240,000 undocumented Colombians currently reside in Panama.293
Colombians lead the list of undocumented people there.294 Ram6n
Lima, Director of Immigration in Panama, noted that the road
would require a large government budget to address the issue of
illegal immigration.295 In the context of national security, Gustavo
P6rez, Director of Panama's National Police, commented that
opening the Dari6n Gap would "cause serious problems for Pana-
manian security, including problems related to narcoterrorism,
kidnapping, and elevated budgets required for strengthening the
police presence in the area."296 Panama has long feared the spil-
lover into Panama of armed Colombian groups (right-wing
paramilitary groups and the left-wing FARC guerrillas) with a
subsequent increase in violence inside Panamanian borders.297
291. See LA PRENSA (Pan.), Oct. 25, 2004 (translation by author), available at http://
biblioteca.prensa.com/contenido/2004/10/25/25-6anotal.html. Though this article
likely included a title and author in its original publication in La Prensa, the author
does not have the original newspaper in his files. Copies are available only from La
Prensa in Panama. The preceeding web page provides the full text of the article.
292. Roberto Lpez Dubois, Cortizo Objeta Apertura del Tap6n de Daridn [Cortizo
Objects to Opening the Darign Gap], LA PRENSA (Pan.), Jan. 6, 2005, at 2.
293. See LA PRENSA (Pan.), Nov. 6, 2004, available at http://biblioteca.prensa.com/
contenido/2004/11/06/6-28a-cuadro.html [hereinafter LA PRENSA, Nov. 6, 2004].
Though this article likely included a title and author in its original publication in La
Prensa, the author does not have the original newspaper in his files. Copies are
available only from La Prensa in Panama. The preceeding web page provides the full
text of the article.
294. See id.
295. See Panamd Se Opone, supra note 285.
296. See Desmienten Informaci6n en Sentido Contrario [Contrary Information
Denied], EL TIEMPO (Colom.), Nov. 26, 2004, http://colombia.indymedia.org/news/
2004/12/19861.php (scroll down to article).
297. See Interview with Vladimir Franco, Director of Foreign Relations, Ministry of
Foreign Relations, in Panama City, Panama (June 1, 2006) (notes on file with author)
[hereinafter Franco Interview].
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Panama is also sensitive to sovereignty issues in the border
region with Colombia. Panamanian officials tend to view Colom-
bia as a large and powerful neighbor with serious social and eco-
nomic problems that historically maintained political control over
small and vulnerable Panama. Yet, this neighbor has been unable
to resolve its serious social and political problems. Increased
numbers of Colombians in Dari6n (and Panama), in addition to
the spillover of Colombian problems, generate concern about the
"colombianization" of Dari6n.2 9s
Other concerns about the project in Panama focus on the lack
of local input into the decision-making process. Dari6n's only
newspaper, the bimonthly La Voz de Darign, recently discussed
the current debate surrounding the road. The paper's position is
that Dari6n's residents and Native communities have been
ignored in this broader debate between high-level officials from
Panama, Colombia, and the United States governments.29 9 The
newspaper commented, "[w]ho has asked us if we agree with the
opening of the Dari6n Gap? Who has asked us if we agree with
the highway connection to South America? The answer is no
one."
300
Road opponents do note that alternatives to the road exist.
From 1994-1996, a ferry transported 200,000 persons, 4,000 con-
tainers, and 2,000 vehicles between Col6n (Panama) and Carta-
gena (Colombia) before abandoning this route to become a floating
casino in Tampa, Florida." 1
As of mid-2006, many Panamanian officials did not even
appear to be aware of the recently discussed route for the highway
through Unguia and Acandf perhaps adjacent to the potential
298. See id.; Jorge Conte, LA PRENSA (Pan.), Jan. 31, 2006, http://biblioteca.prensa.
com/contenido/2006/01/31/31-13a-notl.html; Ruben Darfo Paredes, Insistencia o
Injerencia [Insistence or Meddling], LA PRENSA (Pan.), Jan. 9, 2005, available at http://
biblioteca.prensa.com/contenido/2005/01/09/9-13a-not2.html. Though Mr. Conte's
article likely included a title in its original publication in La Prensa, the author does
not have the original newspaper in his files. Copies are available only from La Prensa
in Panama. The preceeding web page provides the full text of the article.
299. See Mario Echeverria Palomino, El Tap6n de Daridn, una Poldmica por
Resolver [The Daridn Gap, Controversy to Resolve], LA Voz DE DARIIIN (Pan.), Feb. 15,
2005, at 13 [hereinafter Poldmica por Resolver].
300. Id.
301. See Rodrigo G6mez, Preservemos el Tap6n de Darign [Let's Preserve the Darign
Gap], LA PRENSA (Pan.), Jan. 6, 2005, at 12A. The passenger ferry service ended
when Colombia wanted to transport agricultural products which Panama rejected
because of concerns about plant health and security. See Franco Interview, supra
note 297.
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electric transmission line. °2 However, this route could pass the
northern tip of the Darien National Park, the Comarca Kuna-
Yala, and/or the Emberi Cdmaco Comarca. Indeed, it would have
to pass through one or more of these areas. Even without road
construction, the electric route could cause many of the same
impacts as the highway.
In short, the general perspective of Panamanians with respect
to Colombia and the construction of the Pan-American Highway in
particular is characterized by ignorance, fear, and apprehension.
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT THE PAN-AMERICAN HIGHWAY
The proposed highway construction raises many issues that
are broader than concerns of individual government officials in
Panama or Colombia, representatives of economic sectors or envi-
ronmental organizations, or social and ethnic groups. All these
concerns would have to be evaluated in a holistic manner by offi-
cials responsible for the appropriate environmental and social
assessments and, ultimately for the decision whether to allow the
road to be built or not.
A. Human and Animal Health Concerns
Opening a highway through a tropical rainforest and, subse-
quently, creating a new vehicle for land communication between
South and North America raise numerous health issues for ani-
mals, plants, and even humans. One could even imagine the
intentional introduction of a disease for political purposes, i.e.
"bioterrorism," occurring as a result of the new highway.
1. Foot and Mouth Disease - Fiebre Aftosa
The first epidemic of Foot and Mouth Disease, a viral disease
affecting hoofed animals, appeared Argentina in the late 19th
Century.3 By 1961, this extremely contagious and deadly disease
had spread throughout Colombia. 04 The forests and wetlands of
Darien served as an effective barrier for the disease, and it never
302. From the sum of his interviews, the author sensed that he was bringing this
news to some Panamanian officials.
303. CoMIsION PANAMA - ESTADOS UNIDOS PARA LA ERRADICACI6N Y PREVENCION
DEL GusANo BARRENADOR DEL GANADO [U.S.-PANAMA COMMISSION FOR THE
PREVENTION AND ERADICATION OF CATTLE SCREW-WORM], HOJA INFORMATIVA SOBRE LA
FIEBRE AFTOSA [FACT SHEET ABOUT FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE], http://www.copeg.org/
aftosa.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2007) [hereinafter U.S.-PANAMA COMMISSION].
304. See id.
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spread into Panama or to points north."5 In fact, Panama, Cen-
tral America, and the Caribbean Islands have never experienced a
case of the disease.306 The Comitg para la Prevenci6n de la Fiebre
Aftosa (Committee for Prevention of Food-and-Mouth Disease -
COPFA) was established in 1974 to prevent the spread of the dis-
ease from Colombia into Dari6n, and subsequently into Central
America, Mexico, and the United States. 7 An outbreak of the dis-
ease in the United States could result in a loss of more than $20
billion.30 COPFA employs field surveillance, training programs,
data analysis, and infrastructure.3 9 The United States and
Colombia created a similar commission in 1973.310 Today Choc6
Department is free of Foot and Mouth Disease, and the coopera-
tive program between the USDA and the Colombian Agricultural
Institute (ICA) maintains a sanitary barrier between endemic
areas and disease-free areas in northern Colombia. 1' The road
connection and its secondary impacts, such as increased deforesta-
tion and conversion to savanna grasslands, could create the risk of
spread of the disease from infected areas of Colombia to Choc6 and
then to Darien.
2. Cattle Screw-Worm - Gusano Barrenador
Recent efforts in Panama involving the Comisi6n Panamd-
Estados Unidos para la Erradicaci6n y Prevenci6n del Gusano
Barrenador del Ganado (U.S.-Panama Commission for Eradica-
tion and Prevention of Cattle Screw-Worm) have focused on eradi-
cation of the screw-worm larvae (Cochliomyia hominivorax) which
attacks cattle, feeds on animal flesh, and can kill individuals
within a week. 12 Annual losses in the Panama cattle industry as
a result of the screw-worm are estimated to be $10 million. 13 The
flies are found throughout South America, but today North
America remains free of the insect. 14 Campaigns involve spraying
305. See id.
306. See id.
307. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE ERADICATION / FOREIGN




311. See id. But see Interview with Jos6 P~rez, UN Foundation, in Panama City,
Panama (May 30, 2006) (revealing that some experts consider that Choc6's foot and
mouth disease warning system's effectiveness is "poor").
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and releasing sterile male flies throughout Panama, as well as
twenty miles into Colombia in the municipalities of Acand,
Ungufa, Rio Sucio, and Jurad6515 In July 2006, Panama and a
twenty-mile buffer zone in Colombia were declared free of the
screw-worm.316 The area east of the Panama Canal remains an
alert area that should serve as a permanent prevention barrier,
while the area west of the Canal is a vigilance area or buffer
zone.317 Darien Province bordering on Colombia remains a critical
alert zone in the efforts to control this insect pest.1
While it appears that this insect is currently under control in
Panama, a highway connection between Panama and areas in
South America where the disease is prevalent creates a risk that
could lead to reinfection in Panama.
3. Human Diseases
Road construction across the Darien Gap could increase the
likelihood of outbreaks of tropical diseases and their spread either
to North or South America. Possible diseases include Venezuela
Equine Encephalitis (VEE), yellow fever, oncocercosis, cutaneous
leishmaniasis, visceral leishmaniasis, and Chaga Disease.
Although cutaneous leishmaniasis exists in Panama, visceral
leishmaniasis is in South America, principally in areas of Brazil,
and could potentially spread to the north. 9
B. Environmental Concerns
This biogeographical region, which is one of the most species-
rich areas on the planet and which is fairly undisturbed by
humans, could suffer grave impacts as a result of road
construction.
1. Uncontrolled Colonization and Deforestation
The increased colonization of forested areas of Dari6n and
Choc6 will be the most serious impact resulting from the road con-




318. See Interview with Evidelio Adames, Professor, Universidad de Panamd, in
Santiago, Veraguas, Panama (Aug. 11, 2006) (notes on file with author).
319. See id.; JORGE ARIAS ET AL., EPIDEMIOLOGIA Y CONTROL DE LA LEISHMANIASIS EN
LAS AMtRICAS, POR PAIs o TERRITORIO [EPIDEMIOLOGY AND CONTROL OF LEISHMANIASIS
IN THE AMERICAS, By COUNTRY OR TERRITORY], ORGANIZACI6N PANAMERICANA DE LA
SALUD [PAN-AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION] (1996).
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will be practically impossible to control despite the best plans
developed by authorities. Concentration of lands in agro-industry
enterprises and cattle ranches will follow. Examples after con-
struction of the Pan-American Highway segments to Yaviza (Pan-
ama) and Rio Le6n (Colombia) are illustrative.2 Construction of
these road segments promoted uncontrolled colonization and
deforestation, not only immediately along the road, but up to ten
to twenty kilometers from the road.12 ' Even in these scenarios,
plans existed for the "orderly" colonization of the areas but were
not implemented. 2  Many studies demonstrate the adverse
impact of road construction in Neotropical areas.323 In Latin
America, road construction through forested areas has often led to
rapid deforestation and uncontrolled colonization. 24 There is no
reason to expect that Darien and Choc6 would vary from this
norm.
Uncontrolled colonization of the region will lead to deforesta-
tion, disruption of fragile tropical forest equilibria, fragmentation
of the rainforest, loss of endemic species of flora and fauna, soil
erosion and degradation, alteration of hydrology and river flows,
and losses of areas where native peoples have practiced
agroforestry and other traditional agricultural techniques. Loss of
320. See ARDEN & PRICE CONSULTING, ATLAS DE Los RECURSOS MARINO - COSTEROS
DE LA PROVINCIA DEL DARIEN [ATLAS OF MARINE-COASTAL RESOURCES OF DARItN
PROVINCE] C-3 (2003); see also Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 12.
321. See generally Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 12, 14-15 (discussing
deforestation in the area).
322. See PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF DARII8N, supra note 195, at 6.
323. See generally DAVID KAIMOWITZ, LIVESTOCK AND DEFORESTATION CENTRAL
AMERICA IN THE 1980s AND 1990s: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE (Center for International
Forestry Research, 1996) (analylzing "seven factors to explain the conversion of forest
to pasture in Central America").
324. See George Ledec, New Directions for Livestock Policy: An Environmental
Perspective, in DEVELOPMENT OR DESTRUCTION 27-28, 52-54 (Theordore E. Downing et
al. eds, 1992); SHELTON H. DAVIS, VICTIMS OF THE MIRACLE: DEVELOPMENT AND THE
INDIANS OF BRAZIL 148 (1985); CATHERINE CAUFIELD, IN THE RAINFOREST: REPORT
FROM A STRANGE, BEAUTIFUL, IMPERILED WORLD 40, 106, 146 (1986); SUSANNA HECHT
& ALEXANDER COCKBURN, THE FATE OF THE FOREST: DEVELOPERS, DESTROYERS AND
DEFENDERS OF THE AMAZON 54, 56, 158 (1990); James Nations & H. Jeffrey Leonard,
Grounds of Conflict in Central America, in BORDERING ON TROUBLE: RESOURCES &
POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA 55, 78-79 (Andrew Maguire & Janet Welsh Brown eds.,
1986); JOHN EDWARD MYERS, IRC AMERICAS PROGRAM DISCUSSION PAPER, COLOMBIA'S
BIODIVERSITY UP FOR GRABS 1 (June 2, 2005), http://americas.irc-online.org/pdf/
reports/0506colombia.pdf; Roberto L6pez Dubois, LA PRENSA (Pan.), Nov. 24, 2004,
available at http://biblioteca.prensa.com/contenido/2004/11/24/25-6anotal.html.
Though Mr. L6pez's article likely included a title in its original publication in La
Prensa, the author does not have the original newspaper in his files. Copies are
available only from La Prensa in Panama. The preceeding web page provides the full
text of the article.
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tropical forests may even have implications for global climate
change.
Panama appears particularly unprepared in its ability to
orchestrate organized land settlements, especially in a conflict-fil-
led, peripheral region such as Darien. In Darien today, land con-
flicts between colonos and native people outside the Indian lands
(comarcas) are common. 25 Clear demarcation of Darien's pro-
tected areas and comarcas remains a dream because the state pro-
gram to grant land titles is still in its early stages. 6 Clearly,
Panama would be overwhelmed by the opening of the region to an
international highway.
2. Atrato Wetlands
An extensive wetland ecosystem exists adjacent to the Atrato
River from the Gulf of Urabd south for over 200 km.327 All road
proposals involve crossing these wetlands and the Atrato River.
Not only would road construction across this area be difficult, it
would also have serious environmental impacts. Filling wetlands
to build a causeway could alter water flow and hydrology. Feasi-
bility studies performed in 1998 recommended elevated bridges
over shallow wetlands and the use of geotextile materials for lim-
ited fill to avoid these problems.32 ' The highway across these wet-
lands will also act as a barrier to migration of terrestrial and
aquatic fauna. Colombia has had a history of disastrous exper-
iences, for example in the Ci6naga Grande de Santa Marta, with
construction of roads through coastal wetlands disrupting hydrol-
ogy and adversely impacting wetland vegetation.3 29
325. See Jos6 Gonzdlez Pinilla, Indigenas y Colonos Se Enfrentan a Tiros
[Indigenous People and Colonizers Come to Blows], LA PRENSA (Pan.), Aug. 17, 2004,
at 1A.
326. See Rafael Prez G., Una Realidad Panamefia II: Titulaci6n de Tierras Estd en
la Agenda [A Panamanian Reality: Land Titles are on the Agenda], LA PRENSA (Pan.),
May 8, 2006, avaiable at http://mensual.prensa.comlmensual/contenido/2006/05/08/
hoy/panorama/592835.html.
327. See GRAN ATLAs, supra note 4, at 35.
328. See INVs, supra note 16, at 10-12.
329. See Gustavo Cotes, Gesti6n Institucional para la Rehabilitaci6n de la
Ecorregi6n Cidnaga Grande de Santa Marta y sus Bosques de Manglar, in Los
MANGLARES DE LA ECORREGI6N CIPNAGA GRANDE DE SANTA MARTA: PASADO, PRESENTE
Y FuTURo [MANGROVES OF THE CIgNAGA GRANDE DE SANTA MARTA ECOREGION: PAST,
PRESENT, AND FUTURE], 41, 42-44 (Jesfis Garay Tinaco et al. eds., 2004); Heliodoro
Sdnchez-Pa6z et al., Historia del Proceso de Deterioro de los Bosques de Manglar
[History of Deterioration of the Mangrove Forests), in Los MANGLARES DE LA
ECORREGION CIgNAGA GRANDE DE SANTA MARTA: PASADO, PRESENTE Y FUTURO 61-73
(Jesds Garay Tinaco et al. eds., 2004).
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3. Impacts on National Parks and Protected Areas
The high route through Palo de Letras would bisect two
UNESCO World Heritage Sites: Dari6n and Los Katios National
Parks.3 ' The currently favored Caribbean coastal route through
the Ungufa and Acandi municipalities would avoid direct
encroachment through the center of Los Katios but would still
cross through protected areas in Panama. This route probably
would have to pass through the northern tip of the Dari6n
National Park, the Kuna-Yala Comarca, and/or the Emberd
C6maco Comarca. These protected areas would experience the
direct impacts of forest disturbance and uncontrolled colonization.
Even if the route does not directly pass through a protected
area, the road may facilitate entry of colonists into the region,
with resulting logging and settlement inside the protected areas.
It would also lead to uncontrolled selective and clear-cut logging,
mining, agriculture, and hunting, as well as facilitate the entry of
invasive and exotic species to the region. Even human distur-
bances completely outside the borders of the protected areas can
impact wildlife populations and water flow inside the protected
areas. These indirect impacts would be very difficult to control
because they would be widespread and require great investments
in personnel, infrastructure, and institutional development and
coordination, not to mention bi-national coordination.
4. Trafficking in Protected Wildlife
Trafficking in wildlife is already a problem in Dari6n and
Choc6. 13 ' Further highway construction will facilitate access by
wildlife traffickers to new areas and will also increase the illicit
international shipments of protected species both ways across the
border.
330. See UNESCO World Heritage, Los Katios National Park, http://whc.unesco.
org/pg.cfm?cid=31&idsite=711 (last visited Mar. 19, 2007); UNESCO World
Heritage, Dari6n National Park, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/159 (last visited Mar.
19, 2007); INvfAs, supra note 16, at 27, 30.
331. See Jorge G. Conte B., LA PRENSA, Jan. 31, 2006, available at http:ll
biblioteca.prensa.com/contenido/2006/O1/31/31-13a-notl.html. Though Mr. Conte's
article likely included a title in its original publication in La Prensa, the author does
not have the original newspaper in his files. Copies are available only from La Prensa
in Panama. The preceeding web page provides the full text of the article.
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C. Political Concerns
1. Colombian Political Violence
Choc6 Department and northwestern Colombian have a
twenty-year history of widespread political violence. 32 Violence
has involved struggles between left-armed groups, left-wing guer-
rillas, and right-wing paramilitary groups, between the Army and
left-armed organizations, and between all of the above-mentioned
groups against the civilian population in the region.333 This has
created a grave humanitarian crisis with an impact that has
spread to all of Colombia and into Panama.
Construction of transportation infrastructure in Choc6 could
facilitate paramilitary operations in the region with continued vio-
lations of human rights. It could also promote new economic
opportunities for agroindustry and export businesses that could
further displace native communities through illegal force and
various "legal" techniques. On the other hand, road proponents
suggest that it will allow the government to occupy the border
area more effectively and promote stability and security.
2. National Security Issues for Panama
Panama's principal concern centers on the potential spillover
of Colombian violence into its eastern region and the implications
that this has for Panamanian national security. 34 Panama abol-
ished its army in 1989 and traditionally depended on the United
States military for international security issues. 3' Today the
nation only has minimal capability for reacting to Colombian bor-
der issues and defends the border region with a police force of
about 2,000 officers who are stationed largely in Darien towns,
rather than on border outposts. 33 6 Thus, Panama's weak National
Police force is incapable of effectively defending the border with
Colombia and controlling narco-trafficking.3 37 Due to its long his-
tory of hosting U.S. military bases and dependence on the United
332. See COMISION ANDINA DE JURISTAS, URABA (SERIE INFORMES REGIONALES DE
DERECHOS HuMANos) [ANDEAN COMMISSION OF JURISTS, URABA (SERIES OF HUMAN
RIGHTS REGIONAL REPORTS)] 75-116 (1994) (referencing Chapter 5: Actual Human
Rights Situation); GONZALEZ, supra note 115, at 126-43 (providing statistics and
logistical information about violence in the region).
333. See GONZALEZ, supra note 115, at 140.
334. See EL CIRCULO, supra note 239, at 104-05.
335. See id. at 113, 116.
336. See Suman, Globalization, supra note 45, at 17.
337. See Forigua Interview, supra note 230.
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States for security issues, Panama has paid little attention to
security issues on the Panama-Colombia border.
The Colombian conflict presents a great threat to Panama-
nian stability.3 s Panama recognized these threats with the adop-
tion of the Foundations of Panamanian National Security Policy
in 2000."39 The document notes that Panama aims to confront the
following issues: organized crime, arms smuggling, illegal immi-
gration, terrorism, narco-trafficking, and environmental degrada-
tion.34° The Panama-Colombia border region presents all of these
threats, particularly because of the weak presence of governmen-
tal authority, which makes the area insecure and ripe for a pleth-
ora of illegal activities.
Even without the road connection, Colombian violence has
spilled over into Darien Province4.3 1 In the past twelve years,
incursions of right-wing paramilitaries called Colombian Self-
Defense Groups (the AUC) and of left-wing FARC have been com-
mon; more than eighteen incidents have been reported since
1993.142 More than fifteen people have been killed, and at least
seven have been kidnapped. 43 These groups enter Panama to
maintain arms and munitions supply routes, secure drug routes
out of Colombia, and escape the Colombian military, as well as
right- or left-wing forces.3" Murders of civilians, kidnappings,
burning of homes, and armed skirmishes have occurred in numer-
ous villages - particularly those on the upper Tuira River between
El Real and the Colombian border, including Uni6n Choc6, Yape,
Boca de Cupe, and Pdcuro. 345 The victims are often people who are
suspected of selling supplies to the "enemy."346 These events have
caused fear among Dari6n residents, particularly those who live
338. See EL CiRCULO, supra note 229, at 123.
339. See Resoluci6n de Gabinete No. 34, Jun. 21, 2000, Por la cual se Adoptan los
Fundamentos de la Politica Panamefia de Seguridad [By Which the Foundations of
Panamanian National Security Policy are Adopted], Gaceta Oficial No. 24,083, Jun.
27, 2000 (Pan.).
340. See id. (recitals).
341. See Franco Rojas, Secuelas de una Guerra Ajena - Los 18 Ataques de los
Cltimos 10 Aios [Sequel to a Foreign War - The 18 Attacks of the Past 10 Years], LA
PRENSA (Pan.), Jan. 4, 2005, at 6A.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. See Sara Gallardo M., Guerrilleros y "Paras", a Raya [Guerrillas and "Paras"
at Bay], LA PRENSA (Pan.), Jan. 5, 2005, at 6A.
345. See Roberto Lpez Dubois, Desnutrici6n, el Nuevo Enemigo en Puerto Obaldia
[Malnutrition, the New Enemy of Puerto Obaldia], LA PRENSA (Pan.), Jan. 6, 2005, at
1,6.
346. See Rojas, supra note 341.
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close to the Colombian border. "For the inhabitants of Jaqu6, the
guerrillas are there, above their heads, several centimeters from
their ears .... Their way of speaking gives the impression that at
any moment, a group of armed men is going to jump on their
backs .
In fact, because of real and imagined events, Panamanians
generally perceive Dari6n as a dangerous place. The absence of
official information and formal communication within and about
Dari6n tends to stimulate rumors and increase the perceptions of
insecurity." This fear - often irrational - is a principal reason
why many Panamanians oppose the completion of the Pan-Ameri-
can Highway to Colombia. 49
3. Refugees and Displaced People
Another impact of the violence has been an influx into Darien
of Colombian refugees who wish to escape the violence in their
homeland and are also searching for improved economic possibili-
ties. ° Colombian refugees in the Darien region who reside in
Jaqu6, Puerto Obaldfa, and Boca de Cupe number over one thou-
sand persons.3 1' The largest group, hundreds of Colombian refu-
gees, fled to Jaqu6, Panamd, in 1999 after a battle between the
Colombian Army, the FARC, and AUC in Jurad6, Colombia (sixty
km to the southeast).32 That battle resulted in the deaths of civil-
ians and armed personnel.353 The most recent humanitarian refu-
gees to reach Jaqu6 were forty-seven Wounaan Indians from
347. Urania Cecilia Molina, Jaqug, Donde Habita el Miedo [Jaqug: Where Fear
Lives], LA PRENSA (Pan.), Jan. 7, 2005, at 6A (translation by author).
348. See PROGRAM FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF DARItN, supra note 195, at
32.
349. See ,Hay Suficiente Vigilancia en las Fronteras para Evitar el Narcotrdfico? [Is
There Enough Border Monitoring to Avoid Narcotrafficking?], PANAMA AMERICA, Feb.
21, 2005. According to recent surveys, 55 percent of Panamanians opposed opening
the Darin Gap. See L6pez, Government Proposes, supra note 287.
350. See Donny Meertens, Victims and Survivors of War in Colombia: Three Views
of Gender Relations, in VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA 1990-2000: WAGING WAR AND
NEGOTIATING PEACE 159 (Charles Berquist et al. eds., 2001); STATEMENT OF
DISPLACED PEOPLE Now LIVING IN JAQUI (on file with author).
351. See Grisel Bethancourt, Cuando Huir es la (nica Forma de Salvar la Vida
[When Fleeing is the Only Way to Survive], LA PRENSA (Pan.), May 28, 2006, at A5;
Alta Comisi6n de las Naciones Unidas para Refugiados [U.N. High Commission for
Refugees], El ACNUR Preocupado por Desplazamientos Producidos por el Ataque en
la Frontera de Panamd [UNHCR Concerned about Displacements from Border Attacks
in Panama], Jan. 24, 2003, http://www.acnur.orgindex.php?id-pag=965; Franco
Interview, supra note 297.
352. See generally Molina, supra note 347 (describing continued fear in the region).
353. See id.
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Istmina, Choc6, who fled paramilitary violence.3"4
The displaced people have created tension and debate in Pan-
ama. In 2003 and 2004, the Panamanian government forcibly
repatriated a large group of refugees living in Jaqu6, although
many of these people would have preferred to remain in Dari6n,
Panama. 55 "These refugees say that they prefer to die in Panama,
in the Municipality of Jaqu6 - Darien Province - before returning
to Jurad6 where no one guarantees their safety and they suffer
hardships, where they will be massacred and then have to move
somewhere else again."35 6
The highway could make it easier for Colombian political and
economic refugees to migrate to Panama, which could strain the
delivery of social services in Panama and thereby cause concern in
many sectors of Panamanian society.
4. Integration of Choc6 into Colombia and Darien into
Panama
After its experiences with the Canal Zone, Panama is highly
sensitive to sovereignty issues, particularly in its border regions.
Incursions of paramilitary groups and FARC guerrillas into Pana-
manian territory are viewed by some as Colombian violation of
Panamanian sovereignty.357 Perhaps the structural weaknesses of
Panama as a nation magnify these concerns.
Similarly, some people in Panama are sensitive to what they
consider to be unilateral efforts by Colombia in planning for road
completion and advising Panama that the road would be in Pan-
ama's best interests.3 5 The lack of bilateral cooperation in plan-
ning has not created a favorable environment in Panama for this
project.
5. Bilateral Relations between Panama and Colombia
Panama and Colombia did not develop a close ongoing rela-
tionship with respect to the border area until the past decade. In
1992 the two countries established the Colombian-Panamanian
354. See Bethancourt, supra note 351.
355. Project Counselling Service, Colombia: Informe de Fronteras Abril 2003 (Apr.
25, 2003), http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/OCHA-64C3SR?Open
Document; De Vuelta a Casa: "El Retorno de los Desplazados a Jurad6" [Back Home:
The Return of Displaced People to Jurad6], A LA MAR, Feb. 16, 2004, http://www.
armada.mil.co/index.php?idcategoria=37552.
356. See Choco: Official Disinterest, supra note 128, at 17 (translation by author).
357. See EL C]RCULO, supra note 239, at 127.
358. See Franco Interview, supra note 297; Poldmica por Resolver, supra note 299.
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Commission of Neighbors (Comisi6n de Vecindad Colombo-
Panameia), through which the two countries' Ministries of For-
eign Relations coordinate broad representation of all ministries. 9
The two nations have also established several other joint commis-
sions, including Education and Culture, Technology and Science,
Border Markings, Mechanism for Managing Displaced People, and
Security/COMBIFRON.36 °  The Border Commission (COM-
BIFRON) coordinates information between security forces in the
two countries.3 61 Natural resources officials in both countries have
also met regularly in recent years regarding management of
Darien and Los Katfos National Parks.362
Presidents Moscoso and Uribe have signed several bilateral
agreements to promote communication between the two nations.363
These include the Agreement on Cooperation of Police and the
Permanent Mechanism for Control (Seguimiento) and Coordina-
tion.3 ' Nevertheless, some observers think that the bilateral rela-
tions between Panama and Colombia have not advanced beyond
formalities and do not consider them to be of great importance for
either country.36 It has been suggested that, if Colombia consid-
ered relations with Panama to be important, it would not have
ignored Choc6 and the border region for so many years. 66 Even
today, as the Colombian government appears to be pushing the
conflict with the FARC to the border region, the nation lacks a
clear strategy for social and economic development in the region. 67
While both Colombia and Panama, as well as the United
States, engaged in coordinated, though rocky highway construc-
tion efforts in the 1960s and 1970s, the recent initiative in plan-
ning for the continued construction of the Pan-American Highway
has clearly emerged from Colombia. Today, Panama appears to be
reactive and is not a leader in the discussions.
The asymmetric nature of this highway initiative suggests a
danger in any future environmental assessment for the project.
Colombia has already begun the environmental assessment pro-
359. See MOSQUERA, supra note 168, at 227; Girot, supra note 5, at 186.
360. See Interview with Gina Benedetti, Colombian Ambassador to Panama, in
Panama City, Panama (May 31, 2006) (on file with author).
361. See Forigua Interview, supra note 230.
362. See Girot, supra note 5, at 187.
363. See EL CIRCULO, supra note 239, at 124.
364. See id.
365. See id.
366. See id. at 125.
367. See id.
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cess for the highway in its territory.368 The siting for the Colom-
bian portion of the highway will limit Panama's future options -
both the decision whether to construct the road or not and, addi-
tionally, the decision where to site it. When and if Panama
decides to analyze highway alternatives on its side of the border, it
will apply its own national environmental assessment require-
ments and standards.369 This scenario is a classic example of pro-
ject "segmentation" or "piecemealing", that is, the division of a
project into smaller components that are actually connected
actions and should be evaluated together as a single action. The
danger of segmentation is that it may hide or minimize the full
environmental or socio-economic impacts of a project.3 0 Addition-
ally, it may limit the range of action for the remaining portions of
the larger project and tip the balance of economic and environ-
mental factors by making irretrievable commitments of resources
at an early project stage.
D. Social Impacts
1. Impacts on Afro Communities and Indigenous Peoples
The native residents of the area do not play a decisive role in
the decision-making process concerning the road that could pass
through their lands and villages, and that will clearly change
their lives forever. Of course, opinions vary among the peoples.
Many express concern that they are left out of key aspects of the
planning process and then only informed after decisions already
have been made.37' For example, in May 1994, Chiefs of the Kuna,
Emberd, and Wounaan peoples in Panama met in C~maco and
drafted the Resolution of Indigenous Peoples Concerning the
Opening of the Dari6n Gap. 2 They critiqued their lack of repre-
sentation in the Commission of Neighbors, and, as a result of this
pressure, the Commission created sub-commissions on indigenous
368. See supra note 211 and Part III.E.
369. Panama's environmental assessment process is framed by the General
Environmental Law, Law no. 41, July 1, 1998. See Ley no. 41 del 1 de julio de 1998,
Ley General de Ambiente de la Repliblica de Panamd, GAc. 0. 23, 578, 3 de julio 1998
(Pan.). Specifically articles 23-31, as well as the implementing regulations
promulgated by Executive Decree no. 209 of Sept. 5, 2006. See Decreto Ejecutivo no.
209 del 5 de septiembre de 2006, GAC. 0. 25,625, 6 de septiembre 2006.
370. See DIORI L. KRESKE, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR AGENCIES, CITIZENS, AND CONSULTANTS 109-10 (1996).
371. See Girot, supra note 5, at 191.
372. See id.
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affairs and the environment. 73 The chiefs also were instrumental
in the formation of the Indigenous Commission on the Pan-Ameri-
can Highway.7 Indigenous communities generally oppose con-
struction of the highway. 75
Other residents of the area hope for increased economic alter-
natives and improved government services in the border region
and believe that the road may facilitate this. 76 For people living
in extreme poverty, the road represents a path from isolation and
abandonment to a better future with greater opportunities377
Regardless of the route, the highway route will pass near
many Emberd and Afro villages and will certainly have major
impacts on their traditional cultures. Lands occupied with or
without title also will be at risk as new investors move into the
area. The highway route most favored by the Colombian govern-
ment today would be along the Gulf of Urabd and parallel to the
proposed electric transmission route between Colombia and Pan-
ama, so it would have to pass through the Comarca Kuna-Yala
and/or the Emberd C6maco Comarca 78 Even native peoples'
autonomous areas are at direct risk because the road will allow
increased entry of colonos into Indian lands and will promote
inter-ethnic violence. 79
This mega-project appears to be attracting the interest of
large Colombian private investors who view the highway and
spin-off economic activities as significant financial opportuni-
ties.5 Initiation of the road construction project will likely
increase the land grab in Choc6, and the continuing losers will be
those traditional ethnic groups who are financially and politically
weak and whose communal land tenure systems are neither pro-
tected nor respected. A similar threat exists in Darien but is per-
haps mitigated by the high percentage of the province that has
already been designated as a protected area or comarca 8'
373. See id.
374. See id.
375. See Sdnchez Interview, supra note 150.
376. See discussion on Lomas Aisladas supra Part III.F.
377. See id.
378. See supra Part III.A.
379. See generally Pinilla, supra note 325 (describing violence between colonos and
indigeous peoples). Indeed, this is already occurring.
380. See Colombia: Ofensiva de las FARC-EP contra el Paramilitarismo en el Choc6
[Colombia: FARC Offensive Against Paramilitarism in Choc6], http://www.savanne.
ch/Netzwerk_RESISTENCIA/FARC-EP.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2007)
381. See discussion of Darien's comarca protections supra Part II.D.1.
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2. Illegal Immigration of Colombians into Panama
(Human Smuggling)
The general absence of Panamanian government authorities
outside of the principal towns in Dari6n has led to insecurity and
criminal activities. Smuggling of people from Colombia, South
America, Cuba and even China and India, to Panama and points
north (the United States) occurs across the Choc6-Dari6n bor-
der. 2  Panama is clearly a transit country for human trafficking.
Quantitative estimates of this traffic do not exist, but there is a
great deal of empirical evidence and common knowledge regarding
this activity.
In addition to human trafficking, the road would facilitate the
entry of Colombians into Panama. Unofficial estimates suggest
that today some 300,000 Colombians reside in Panama (approxi-
mately 10 percent of Panama's population).3 Most (240,000) are
undocumented, that is, they entered Panama without a passport
or have remained longer than the allowed period. 4 Although
most of these people are engaged in commercial and business ven-
tures, some are involved in illegal activities. 5 The highway
would open the doors to Colombian immigration into Panama.
3. Drug Smuggling into Panama
Colombia is a major cocaine production nation, and the Pan-
ama route is clearly important with regard to shipments of the
382. See Caracol Radio, Desmantelada Banda de Trdfico de Personas en la Regi6n
de Darien [Human Smuggling Ring Dismanteled in the Darien Region] Sept. 21,
2006, http://www.caracol.com.co/noticias/335515.asp?id=335515; Organizaci6n
Internacional para las Migraciones, Conclusiones de los Encuentros Bilaterales de
Frontera - Coordinaci6n de la Lucha Contra la Trata de Personas [Conclusions from
Bilateral Findings from the Border - Coordination of the Fight against Human
Trafficking], http://www.oim.org.co/modulos/contenido/default.asp?idmodulo=219
(scroll to section regarding Colombia and Panama) (last visited Apr. 10, 2007); Elio
Ndifiez, Alarmate Aumento de Trdfico de Inmigrantes [Alarming Rise in Immigrant
Trafficking], PANAMA AMARICA, available at http://www.pa-digital.com.pa/archive/
02122006/cierret.shtml; Dr. Robert Winslow, A Comparative Criminology Tour of the
World, Panama, http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/namerica/panama.html
(last visited Apr. 10, 2007); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES, PANAMA (2006) http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78900.htm; U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, WESTERN HEMISPHERE 428, www.state.gov/documents/organization/
9476.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2007) (noting Panama's strategic location for illegal
immigration).
383. See LA PRENSA, Nov. 6, 2004, supra note 293.
384. See id.
385. See id. (including prostitution and drug trafficking).
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substance to North American consumers." 6 Both Colombia and
Panama appear on the United States list of drug trafficking coun-
tries.3 7 The highway may create additional opportunities for
shipments. On the other hand, if creation of the highway were
accompanied by increased governmental presence and a concerted
bi-national effort, the region may actually appear less attractive
for illegal activities.
4. Arms Smuggling from Panama to Colombia
Illegal arms shipment is similar to drug smuggling in that an
isolated region is an attractive area for this activity. Unlike drugs
that flow from Colombia to Panama, arms enter Colombia from
Panama and Central America. 8 Precise data is nonexistent, but
anecdotal evidence abounds. For example, according to a report
from the Organization of American States, the Nicaraguan Army
sold the paramilitary forces "3,000 AK-47 assault rifles and five
million rounds of ammunition in 2001. "389 This shipment was
delivered at Turbo on the Gulf of Urabdi. 90 However, generally,
the Pacific route is favored, and arms are exchanged for drugs. 91
5. Demobilized "Paras"
President Uribe's efforts to demobilize the paramilitary
groups and end Colombia's political violence have produced some
successes, although the Choc6 region has been perhaps the most
recalcitrant area in this process. Of course, demobilization really
should include more than delivery of arms to authorities. Many of
the demobilized "paras" remain in the areas where they were
active combatants. 92 Doubts remain about which economic and
386. See Ricardo Sober6n, Mirada a las Fronteras - Panamd-Colombia: Una
Frontera Turbulenta [A Look at the Turbulent Panama-Colombia Border], NOTICIAS
ALiADAS, May 26, 2006, http://noticiasaliadas.org/article.asp?IssCode=&lanCode=2&
artCode=4699. For example, in April 2007 a drug bust off Panama's Pacific coast
discovered twenty tons of cocaine stored in a vessel. The shipment was using Panama
for trans-shipment on its route from Colombia to Mexico. See Chris Kraul, Panama
Drug Bust Reveals Trafficking's Slow Lane, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 2007.
387. See Jennifer Loven, Bolivia Drug Fight Faulted, MiAMI HERALD, Sept. 19,
2006, at 11A.
388. See Roberto L6pez Dubois, Disminuye Contrabando de Armas [Weapons
Contraband Diminishes], LA PRENSA (Pan.), Jan. 9, 2005, at 3A (describing arms
smuggling from Panama) [hereinafter Lpez, Disminuyel.
389. EL CIRCULO, supra note 233, at 239 (translation by author).
390. See id.
391. See Lpez, Disminuye, supra note 388.
392. See ILSA, supra note 136; MATAPAY, supra note 138; Orlando Contreras,
Palma Africana en el Choc6: Una Nueva Plaga para Indios y Negros [African Palms in
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political activities they will engage in. The presence of "ex-paras"
in or near communities where they previously have been active
"cleansers" of social organizations and have engaged in grave
human rights violations creates serious questions regarding their
impact on community peace, stability, and good will. 93 Evidence
suggests that some demobilized "paras" are engaged in purchas-
ing and obtaining land for agroindustry and timber harvesting in
Choc6 - not always by legal means. 94 What implications does this
"reinsertion" have on the traditional land tenure of the native Afro
and Emberd communities? Some observers of Choc6 have sug-
gested that paramilitary demobilization in Urabd could even be
related to construction and operation of the highway.3 95 Demobil-
ized "paras" may be granted the task of "protecting" the Pan-
American Highway. 96
E. Economic Impact
Almost a decade ago the study by the consulting firm Ecology
and Environment estimated that completion of the highway would
cost between $250 and $540 million, depending on the route. 97
President Uribe commented that once the Panamanian Govern-
ment agreed to the road concept, Colombia would search for fund-
ing from the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank,
or the Japanese Government.3 8 Thus, Colombia and Panama
would pay for the road for decades to come. However, would the
road produce benefits for Panama that would offset the costs?
Panamanian industry is not competitive with Colombian
industry because of Panama's relatively high labor costs and lack
Choc6: A New Plague for Indians and Blacks], INDYMEDIA, Dec. 17, 2004, http:l!
colombia.indymedia.orgnews/2004/12/20266.php.
393. Colombian observers consider that the paramilitary presence in the Choc6
region has passed through a number of phases. As the paras entered the area, they
first created generalized terror, via massacres, assassinations, and kidnappings. This
stage was followed by "cleansing" the region of any social organizations that might
provide sites for the opposition. The final stage is paramilitary hegemony and the
consolidation of their social and economic project. See GONZALEZ, supra note 115, at
124.
394. See Veja, supra note 96, at 38-39, 41; Palma Africana, supra note 144, at 28.
395. See A Quign Beneficiard la Panamericana? [Who Benefits from the Pan-
American Highway?], INDYMEDIA, Dec. 8, 2004, http:/colombia.indymedia.org/news/
2004/12/19861.php.
396. See id.
397. See INvfAs, supra note 16, at 27.
398. See Presidential Conference, supra note 228.
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of natural resources.39 9 Moreover, the Panamanian industrial
base is weak and only accounts for about eight percent of the
GDP. °° Colombia boasts a solid industrial base, a long industrial
tradition, and a qualified industrial work force." 1 However, its
salary levels are lower than those in Panama.4"2 The road might
permit cheaper Colombian manufactured and agricultural goods,
such as clothing, textiles, and foodstuffs, to enter Panama, thus
placing the nascent Panamanian industries at an economic
disadvantage.
The highway will require an active and sophisticated system
of controls - immigration, public and animal health, border secur-
ity, customs, wildlife protection, control and enforcement of pro-
tected areas - to minimize the potential negative impacts. To be
effective, control measures must be of high quality and, therefore,
costly. Who will bear the cost of these necessary control mea-
sures? Will the costs and adverse impact on the environmental
resources and the peoples be proportional to the benefits of
improved commerce between the two nations? These questions
must be addressed.
Panama is at risk from most of these potential harms, yet it
does not appear to be the major beneficiary of the project in eco-
nomic, environmental, social, or political terms. All actors must
address this asymmetric "lose-lose" scenario for Panama if the
project is to continue - the Colombian Government in fairness to
its neighbor and the Panamanian Government in fulfillment of its
stewardship responsibilities to its peoples and environment.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
This manuscript has described a bi-national region and
almost a century's worth of attempts to construct a highway
across the border. Today, strong forces of globalization and eco-
nomic integration appear to make the completion of the Pan-
American Highway inevitable, but the timeframe and conditions
surrounding this completion remain uncertain. If this project is to
proceed, which may not be in the best interests of many of the
region's actors, I offer a series of recommendations.
Panama bears the greatest risk from the potential Pan-Amer-
399. See Interview with Jos6 Javier Rivera, Panamanian Chamber of Commerce, in
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ican Highway project. This nation must conduct a comprehensive
evaluation of the potential costs and benefits of the highway and
consider the broad environmental, political, social, and economic
factors in the analysis. The evaluation must engage in the
extremely difficult task of quantifying environmental costs -
many of which are not quantifiable in market terms. This exer-
cise must occur before sectors of the Panamanian government
make any decision or favor any alterative, including the No Action
Alternative. At the same time, Panama's freedom of action to con-
sider alternatives may be limited by Colombia's unilateral plan-
ning efforts.
Segmentation, as discussed above" 3, presents a serious risk
for the comprehensive evaluation of this highway project. We
already see several manifestations of this segmentation. Colom-
bia has begun its environmental evaluation for the highway and
has initiated discussions on siting. Similar evaluation is not
occurring in Panama, but the Colombian decision is highly likely
to influence the ultimate Panamanian outcome. For example, if
Colombia were to construct a road to the border, Panama would
likely one day build its road to connect with the existing Colom-
bian road, rather than to a border site that did not connect with an
existing Colombian road. Another example of segmentation is the
route of the Colombia-Panama electric transmission project. The
discussions concerning the location of this project's route do not
consider that the selected electric transmission route could likely
become the highway route in whole or part.44 Once an electric
transmission corridor is opened across the Darien Gap, its uses
may expand and diversify because the initial investment in plan-
ning, surveying, land acquisition, community outreach, forest
clearing, and provision for logistical support could lower the costs
for expanded uses.
Thus, the environmental assessment for the highway must be
the product of a bi-national study whose scope is the entire project
in both Colombia and Panama. Similarly, all bi-national projects
that enhance terrestrial connectivity between Colombia and Pan-
ama, such as the electric transmission project and the gas pipe-
line, must consider the possibility that the routes for these
projects (in their entirety or partially) may also become the high-
way route. Segmentation of the environmental assessment of the
highway project by country, as well as failure to consider the road
403. See supra Part IV.C.5.
404. See supra Part III.F. and Part III.G.
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connection when evaluating the electric transmission route, both
constitute environmental planning errors that should be avoided.
Both nations should only allow the project if they can identify
and dedicate sufficient funds to effectively monitor, control, and
mitigate all of the potential impacts. An extremely comprehensive
and well-developed plan to monitor and control adverse impacts is
essential. Adequate funding, trained personnel, infrastructure,
institutional development, and bi-national cooperation are prereq-
uisite to approval of road construction. Perhaps the costs should
be funded by a mutually acceptable formula based on the benefits
that the Pan-American Highway might produce to each nation, as
well as on the adverse impacts that the project would cause.
The highway route must avoid direct passage through
national parks and lands that have been granted to the Afro and
indigenous populations in the region. Authorities should not be
allowed to alter protected areas' current boundaries. The Pana-
manian highway route must not pass through lands held in
Native title (comarcas in Panama and resguardos in Colombia) as
a matter of principle. We can expect that some Native leaders will
support road siting through their comarca or resguardo if they are
offered or promised monetary benefits. This type of Native leader
would fail to consider his people's long-term cultural survival and
land tenure if he were to act accordingly. Regardless, a road or
electric transmission route anywhere across the Dari6n Gap will
create great adverse impacts on existing protected areas and
native lands even if the mega-projects do not directly pass through
these areas. Colombia and Panama must ensure that any devel-
opment project not cause irreparable harm to native peoples or
their communities and, additionally, that indigenous and Afro
peoples have secure title to their lands and are safe from individu-
als and businesses that attempt to impose their own control over
these lands.
Meaningful and equitable public participation must occur in
the communities, especially the local Dari6n and Choc6 communi-
ties, as well as in the broader national communities and interest
groups. The residents' viewpoints and concerns must be
respected, and they must have access to information that permits
them to participate intelligently in the planning and decision-
making processes.
All bi-national projects that connect Panama and Colombia,
including a Pan-American Highway, electric transmission line, or
gas pipeline, must be accompanied by a major social and economic
610
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development program for the border region that strengthens com-
munities and local governments, assists communities and pro-
tected areas with planning their land use, encourages
communities to obtain land titles, and creates sustainable eco-
nomic alternatives for the region that are appropriate for its natu-
ral environment. Such sustainable alternatives might include
agroforestry projects, conservation, and appropriate use of the
region's biodiversity, ecotourism, scientific research, and exploita-
tion of natural products as source materials for biotechnology and
medicines, among others.
Some Colombian proponents propose more effective control
measures to avoid spontaneous colonization. They call for lands
west of the Atrato River to be named a special "cultural and envi-
ronmental protection zone."405 Perhaps authorities could create a
limited access regime to this region, thus allowing more effective
control and facilitating conservation efforts. °6
Colombian-Panamanian border security must be viewed in
the broader context of social, economic, environmental, and politi-
cal development of the region. The current development model
based on extraction of Choc6's natural resources has led to politi-
cal violence in Colombia, as well as to environmental destruction.
Both governments need to adopt sustainable development policies
and programs that favor minority communities, provide basic
social services, and protect the region's rich environmental
resources. Authorities, together with the region's communities,
must develop and adopt plans for the region prior to road planning
and construction.
Joint bilateral planning by Colombia and Panama is essential
for the border region. The border between the countries is practi-
cally non-existent, and whatever happens in Colombia affects
Panama and vice versa. Therefore, unilateral efforts to plan,
develop, or establish controls in the region will be unsuccessful.
Perhaps the Colombia-Panama Commission of Neighbors could
create a transboundary integration zone that sectoral institutions
control under the Commission's purview.0 7 Addressing the
impacts of the road construction will require a truly bi-national
effort, rather than unilateral initiatives, if it is to be successful
and effective.08
405. See URABA, supra note 108, at 82.
406. See id.
407. See Girot, supra note 5, at 187.
408. See id.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Recent decades have witnessed an intensification of globaliza-
tion and economic integration in the isolated and often forgotten
transboundary Choc6-Dari6n region, as exemplified by fisheries,
forest products, bananas exports, as well as improved transporta-
tion systems, which are now all linked into global markets. These
linkages also have diversified in recent years to include shrimp,
African palm, cattle, and eco-tourism. Moreover, the region is
infamous for other types of global linkages, trafficking of people,
drugs, and arms, as well as for political violence with ideological
bases.
The region is also infamous for the Darien Gap, a break in the
Pan-American Highway System of just over one hundred kilome-
ters, across a stretch of tropical rainforest and wetlands that form
protected areas that enjoy international stature as UNESCO
World Heritage sites and are traditional lands of Afro and
Emberd-Wounaan peoples.
Today new initiatives have emerged from Colombia to com-
plete the highway that allegedly are imperative for globalization,
free trade, and modernity. These proposals raise great concerns
about the project's impacts on the Dari6n-Choc6 region and its
peoples. Construction of the Pan-American Highway through the
Darien Gap will be a major driver for drastic economic, political,
cultural, and environmental change in the region. It is unclear
whether the responsible institutions in both nations would be
capable of controlling the adverse environmental and cultural
impacts that would stem from road construction and colonization.
There are also concerns regarding whether the alleged benefits of
economic integration would empower local communities, or
whether the benefits would instead be controlled by outside inter-
ests in Panama City, Medellin, or beyond.
The United States is a major actor in the construction of the
Pan-American Highway that has played an important role in
planning for highway construction across the Dari6n Gap during
the past century. The Federal Court's temporary injunction on
U.S. funding for the project across the Dari6n Gap, as well as con-
cerns about foot and mouth disease halted the completion of the
project in the 1970s and subsequent decades. As a result of major
investment in animal disease prevention and control in the past
thirty years, the risk of the spread of these diseases has decreased
significantly. However, today concerns about drug trafficking,
Colombian political violence, and environmental degradation have
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moved to the forefront and continue to influence the United
States' perspective concerning completion of the highway. Shift-
ing perceptions and positions of the U.S. Government with respect
to those issues could strongly influence the highway initiative.0 9
Today's equation of social actors also includes international
environmental groups, World Wildlife Fund, Conservation Inter-
national, The Nature Conservancy, and the World Conservation
Union (IUCN), that consider Darien and Los Katios National
Parks to be critical elements in the global protection of tropical
rainforests.41 ° All of these groups are organizing to fight against
incursions, such as roads, into these protected areas.41
One of the strongest voices arguing for precaution has been
the IUCN General Assembly Declaration (1994), which called on
the governments of Panama and Colombia to consider the
broadest number of alternatives possible for energy and transpor-
tation links, including non-road options; to open the debate on the
project to sectors of the public, particularly ethnic groups in the
area; to conduct extensive evaluations on the environmental,
social, and cultural impact of the highway project and its spec-
trum of alternatives; and only to allow road construction after
implementation of control programs, as well as programs to insure
the integrity and conservation of biological, natural, and human
values.1 2 Thus, while economic integration and globalization
409. See Eaton Aboga por Barrera Natural [Ambassador Eaton Advocates Natural
Barrier], EL SIGLO (Pan.), May 31, 2006, at 13; William W. Mendel, Colombia's
Threats to Regional Security, 81 MILITARY REV. 2, 3 (May-June 2001).
410. See CRITICAL ECOSYSTEM PARTNERSHIP FUND, PERFIL DEL ECOSISTEMA:
CORREDOR DE CONSERVACICN CHOC-MANABf, ECORREGI6N TERRESTRE PRIORITARIA
DEL CHOcO-DARI9N-ECUADOR OCCIDENTAL (HoTsPOT) [PROFILE OF THE ECOSYSTEM:
CHOcO-MANABf CONSERVATION CORRIDOR, PRIORITY TERRESTRIAL ECOREGION OF THE
CHOC6-DARIL N - WESTERN ECUADOR] 32 (Dec. 2005), http://www.cepf.net/Image
Cache/cepf/contentpdfs/final_2espanish_2echoco_2ddarien_2dwestern_2decuador_
2echoco_- 2eep_2epdf/v 1/final.spanish.choco 2ddarien_2dwestern_2decuador.choco.ep.
pdf; Hotspots: Tumbes-Choc6-Magdalena, supra note 39.
411. See Hotspots: Tumbes-Choc6-Magdalena, supra note 39; The Nature
Conservancy, Parks in Peril - Darien Biosphere Reserve, http://parksinperil.org/
wherewework/centralamerica/panama/protectedarealdarien.html (last visited Mar.
29, 2007); Joaquin Molano Barrero, Colombia: Riquezas Selvdticas y L6gicas de
Expropiaci6n [Colombia: Forest Riches and the Logic of Expropriation], in Los
NUEVOS MERCADERES: LA VIDA COMO MERCANCdA [THE NEW MERCHANTS: LIFE AS
MERCHANDISE] 13, 19 (Global Forest Coalition et al. 2005), available at http:/www.
censat.org/Documentos/Ambientalismo/Los NuevosMercaderes.pdf.
412. IUCN, WORLD CONSERVATION CONGRESS, RECOMMENDATION 3.111 - IMPACT OF
ROADS AND OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH THE ECOSYSTEMS OF DARIEN (Nov. 25,
2004), www.iucn.org/congress/2004/members/Individual ResRec -Eng/wcc3 rec 111.
pdf; see also Sofia Kosmas, Comunidad Internacional Objeta Carretera por el Tap6n
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forces advocate for road completion, international conservation
forces argue for caution.
If pressure to construct the Pan-American Highway across
the Dari6n Gap continues to mount and the Pan-American High-
way becomes a reality, Dari6n will be solidly integrated into global
markets at the heart of the Americas. The losers, however, will be
the rich cultural and biological diversities of the region.
de Darign [International Community Objects to a Highway through the Daridn Gap],
LA PRENSA (Pan.), Dec. 3, 2004.
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